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PREFACE

\

The International Joint Commission s 1993 Biennial Meeting on Great Lakes Water
Qiality, included a Workshop on Weight of Evidence. The Commission, in writing its
Sixth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Chiality in 1992, stated that unequivocal evidence has been presented to con rm cause effect linkages between speci c persistent toxic
substances and speci c adverse impacts in sh, birds, turtles and various mammals.

The Commission recognized in its report that scienti c data are open to interpretation and that, notwithstanding the con rmed cause-effect links, unequivocal conclusions
may be dif cult to reach, especially if individual studies are considered in isolation. Un

equivocal evidence of injury to humans caused by exposures to persistent toxic substances
may be dif cult or impossible to obtain because of the subtlety of the effects associated with
low contaminant concentrations and the potentially confounding factors.
The Commission noted that critics have attempted to nd aws with individual stud
ies in order to discredit ndings and conclusions about persistent toxic substances. While
limitations to study design may exist, the Commission concluded that these did not neces
sarily invalidate the ndings and conclusions when considered in a weight of evidence con
text. It therefore adopted a weight of evidence approach: when evidence from the many
studies that indicate injury or the likelihood of injury is taken together, it provides suf cient
justi cation for the virtual elimination of the discharges of persistent toxic substances to the
Great Lakes.

The Commission also advocated the use of this weight of evidence approach by the
Parties to identify other substances suspected of being persistent and toxic and that therefore should be subject to the policy contained in the Great Lakes Water Qiality Agreement
concerning their virtual elimination.
The Commission continues work to better de ne what is meant by weight of evi-

dence. For example, when should a cause and effect approach be used rather than a weight
of evidence approach, and what are the speci c differences? Do these methodologies relate
to prospective as well as retrospective situations? How do these methodologies differ from
risk assessment and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each approach?

At the workshop, representatives from industry and public interest groups participated with members of the scienti c and legal professions to contribute their points of view.
There is no doubt that the Commission s chlorine recommendation in the Sixth Biennial
that the Parties, in consultation with industry and other affected interests, deReport

velop timetables to sunset the use of chlorine and chlorine-containing compounds as indus-

trial feedstocks -- precipitated a vigorous debate on the evidence and on the recommended
solution. These proceedings of the Weight of Evidence Workshop at the 1993 Biennial

Meeting are designed to help resolve this debate by clarifying the terms and methodologies,
and the circumstances under which they should be used.

I

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Chairman Gordon Durnil

International Joint Commission

Washington, DC.

I want to welcome you. I have been looking forward to this session with a great deal
of interest. We have a very interesting panel. As you know, the International Joint Commission has recommended in our Sixth Biennial Report that the Governments of the
United States and Canada adopt a weight of evidence approach. Both governments, and
the Government of Ontario, have now accepted that recommendation, so we are going to

try and figure out what it means that our governments have accepted. Is it Perry Mason
terminology? Is it understood only by lawyers? Is it the measuring of scienti c reports
that the tallest stack wins? Can it be identi ed by applying percentages? Fifty one percent

of the scientists agree that brown is blue, therefore the weight of evidence must be that
brown is blue. I don t think it s any of that, at least in my view.

As a lawyer, I want you to pass out of your minds the way lawyers use words. Don t

think about a preponderance of the evidence in civil trials, and beyond a shadow of a doubt

in criminal trials and so forth. Forget all
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there is suf cient evidence or accumulated
knowledge or enough potential for harm so that we should expect a reasonable person to
assume that scientists should sound the warning and policymakers should act? Do we look
at each scientific study and weigh the nonquestionable conclusions with those that are questionable? Do we reject all conclusions in a study if one or some of the conclusions cannot
be proven beyond some level of doubt? Even though it s possible to pick holes in every
study, especially on methods, does not a de nitive time come when there is enough evidence
upon which to act?

On a broader scale, do we just deal with scientific studies in applying a weight of evidence approach or do we also consider the perceptions of lay people in a speci c community? Last week I attended a RAP (Remedial Action Plan) review meeting in Presque Isle,
in Erie, Pennsylvania. We were out at the bay with a number of governmental people from
both countries, looking at the waters, standing on the edge, and a couple of old codgers
came up and they were bearded and sort of grizzly looking, like they may have been the

grandfathers of some of the guys playing for the Phillies in the World Series (against that

other team). One of them had an orange hunting cap and a fatigue jacket and the other

one had on one of those camou age hats and camou age coats, so I couldn t tell what he

looked like. But they walked up and said, You guys are standing in our shing spot." 80

we moved, and we said, You been shing here long?

And they said, Yes, since the 1930s,

been here every day." And we said, Anything different?" And they said, Yes, everything

is different. There used to be a lot of sh, we used to get all of our meals out of here, now
we don t catch very many sh. There s not much out there, the ones we catch have sores all

over them, and you can t eat them. The sea gulls are not here, we saw just one today and
nobody cares." When we asked what had caused the problems, they pointed out a coking
plant and a couple of factories across the bay.
So the only reason I m telling that story is I think those guys are part of the weight

of evidence, and I think we have to consider their perceptions and their reactions. There is

a very interesting article in Environment Magazine last month, which makes the point that
quite often the public sees the problem, sees what they think is the cause and ties the two
together in their minds very quickly. And then a whole body of scientists from industries,
from government, from elsewhere comes along and tells them that can t be the case and
maybe 15 or 20 years later we find out it is the case. So I don t think we can leave the
perceptions of the public out of the weight of evidence, but we ll hear what all of you have
to say.
For a nal introductory thought, if the scienti c community has grave concerns about
potential threats from a substance being introduced into the environment, but they don t
have suf cient data, especially human data, to de nitively declare a substance harmful, but

they suspect they may have such proof when the next generation reaches puberty, should
they not come forward with evidence they now have, even if such evidence is more suspicion than fact? Is that something that we should talk about here today.> If not, then how
do we deal with preventive measures in the face of scienti c uncertainty?
So, those are some of my questions and we have a panel here to give us their expert
view and their subject matter. The panel includes Mr. Glen Fox of the Canadian Wildlife

Service, discussing scienti c principles; Dr. Joseph Jacobson of Wayne State University, who

will give results of his research on children of Great Lakes sh consumers; Professor
Margaret A. Berger, Brooklyn Law School, will discuss the implications of the Daubert case;
Dr. William Owens of Procter and Gamble Company will present research on the basis for

removing biologically active persistent toxic substances; Mr. Jack Weinberg of Greenpeace
will advocate the precautionary inference; and Dr. Rosalie Bertell of the International Insti
tute of Concern for Public Health will talk on weight of evidence versus proof of causation.

SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES
Mr. Glen Fox
Canadian Wildlife Service
Ottawa, Ontario

We are all, with all the other biota in the Great Lakes ecosystem, unwitting subjects

in an unknown number of natural experiments. They are unknowingly initiated, and have

not been through the statistician s of ce for his input on design, they are not screened or

approved by an animal care or a medical ethics committee. At some later date, you or I, or
somebody we knowwill make some observation or an event will occur that will bring our
plight to our attention.

Then we will initiate studies based on group, or on population characteristics and
compare the effects on different populations or groups in the hope of relating the observed
differences to differences in the local environment, or lifestyle of these individual
populations. Such ecological correlations provide clues to causal or ecological hypotheses
that may be tested in individuals.

Observations of the apparent effects of contaminants on free living fish and wildlife
and human health are always correlational. That s what we have to work with. Potential
causal agents considered are those we measure or observe and they are probably only a subset of those present. We start out with imperfect knowledge at best. Free living organisms
are exposed to a number of contaminants and stressors and the effects we observe or meas
ure are the organism s integrated biological response to that suite of stressors. We must not
fall prey to what is known to epidemiologists as the ecological fallacy, the idea that occurrence of an effect in conjunction with a plausible environmental factor proves that the factor
is the cause.
These observations are often all we can work with. We need to draw together the
disparate threads of evidence and make them into some sort of coherent whole so that we

can scientifically and ethically make socially defensible regulatory decisions.

Lilienfeld and Lilienfeld, two very prominent epidemiologists, suggest that in medi

cine and in public healthit would appear reasonable to adopt a rather pragmatic concept of
causality. They wrote as follows: A causal relationship would be recognized to exist whenever evidence indicates that the factors form part of a complex of circumstances that in
crease the probability of the occurrence of the disease and that a diminution of one or more
of these factors decreases the frequency of that disease.
In disease prevention, it is initially only necessary to identify an association between

exposure to a critical factor and the incidence
of disease without necessarily identifying the
ultimate cause of the disease. For example, we
can protect people

from lung cancer
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tempt to address the relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer usrng epide-

miological evidence. The committee concluded that statistical methods alone cannot estab
lish proof of a causal relationship; the causal signi cance of an association is a matter of

judgment, which goes beyond any statement of statistical probability.

We must, therefore, have a basis for deciding whether a statistical association derived

from an observational study represents a cause and effect association. To do this we systematically evaluate the evidence using the criteria that have been established by epidemiologists. These criteria provide one means of objectively evaluating the relationship between a
suspected cause and associated effect. It s a process and a framework upon which we can
build a balanced judgment. These criteria are of greater assistance in rejecting causal hypotheses than in confirming them. We can use them to deal with the quality of the evi
dence that we have; not necessarily to measure the quantity of evidence. And they will pro
vide us with the means of deciding what evidence is admissible, so to speak, before we start
to weigh the quantity of evidence.

The following is a brief review of the epidemiologists criteria for causality:
The first one is time order. Does the cause precede the effect in time? This may be
difficult to establish in systems with little historical data.

a

The second is strength of the association and asks whether cause and effect coincide

in their distribution. Is the prevalence of the effect in the exposed populations large relative
to unexposed populations?

The third is specificity of the associations. Could the effect be due to a different
cause? Could the proposed cause produce other effects? Can alternate hypotheses be eliminated? In the context of the Great Lakes, where a multiplicity of persistent toxic substances
and ecological perturbations are present, specificity may be complicated by chemical inter
actions, commonality of the mode of action, and interspecific differences in the susceptibil
ity of biota.
Consistency of the association is the fourth criterion. Has the association been repeatedly observed in different places, circumstances, times and species, or by other investigators with different research designs?
And finally, coherence of the associations. Is the cause-effect interpretation consist

ent with our current understanding of biological mechanism(s) underlying the effect? Is an

exposure response relationship present? Do laboratory studies support the proposed rela
tionship? Do remedial actions lead to altered frequency and severity of the effects? Only
biologically plausible associations can result in biological significance, however, judgments
on this basis are bound by our imperfect knowledge at any time.
Weighing the strength of evidence is always required. What is the nature of the evi-

dence that must be ignored to conclude that no causal relationship exists? What alternate

explanation will fit our observations and what other differences between our contrasted
groups could equally, or better account for the observed incidences? One of the fathers of

epidemiology, Sir Austin Bradford Hills, wrote that all scientific work is incomplete,
whether it is observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modi-

fied by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us the freedom to ignore the
knowledge that we already have, orto postpone the action it appears to demand at any

given time. Complete logical certainty is not available in science. The best we can do is
reach the most reasonable explanation based on the evidence at hand.

We have tried to apply these criteria to case studies on populations of fish, wildlife
and human health in the Great Lakes basin. In 1989 in Chicago, I presented these criteria
and a number of people then applied them to their data. These case studies and the criteria
were published in the August 1991 issue of the journal of Toxirology and Environmental
Healt/J as the proceedings of the First Cause Effect Linkages Workshop. The Second
Cause Effect Linkages Workshop was held in association with the 1991 Biennial Meeting
at Traverse City in Michigan where more data was presented. The proceedings of that
workshop were published in the December 1993 issue of the journal of Great Lakes Research.

More recently the Chlorine Institute contracted CANTOX to look into the issue of

whether or not there is a toxicological problem in the Great Lakes that might be related to

chlorine, and to elucidate the scientific principles for evaluating the potential for adverse effects of chlorinated organic chemicals. CANTOX, a very well recognized toxicological

contract group, used these same criteria and proposed their use as an adequate way of approaching this question. So I think we are talking about something that has been tried and
tested.

Cause and effect associations which are epidemiologically consistent should be conrmed experimentally, if possible using extensions of Koch s postulates for proving that the
particular pathogen causes a specific disease. First we would do an experiment with controlled exposures of a susceptible organism to a concentration gradient of that chemical or
suspected agent, be it a complex ef uent or contaminated medium, that is associated with

the effect in the field. From those controlled exposures we would expect to find a related
gradient in the response. The second strategy is to show, from analysis of samples from field

studies, that the organisms in the eld are exposed to the suspected contaminant or agent

and that the degree of exposure is consistent with the degree of exposure that causes the

effect in a laboratory animal.

Economically and practically, it is far easier to regulate contaminants at the source of
production, than to react after their release into the ecosystem. We should not wait for
damage to occur and then try to x the situation. Instead we should use appropriate strategies to prevent the damage from occurring in the first place. In recent political discussions in our two countries and at this 1993 IJC Biennial Meeting, we have repeatedly heard
our neighbours, our children, our constituents, our taxpayers, our board members and our
employees tell us that there must be a fundamental change in thinking of industry, govern
ment and society. I think that ethical issues are too often subservient to legal and economic
issues. To protect human health we need to consider what is ethical rather than what is

legal or least expensive. We ve talked a lot about protecting human health, but we also

have to protect biodiversity and the planet Earth and to do that we need to consider what
is ethical instead of what is permissible.
This change requires thathumankind recognizes its true place in relation to this
world. We are part of Nature, inseparable constituents of the ecosphere and that is a truth
that cannot be denied. One of my favourite thinkers in the field of modern ecology is Stan
Rowe from the University of Saskatchewan, who has written a wonderful book called Home
Place in which he has had a hard look at where the world is going and what it is we need
to do to realign our thinking to be more compatible with our continued existence on this
biosphere. Stan puts it this way, Nature is where we come from and where we belong in
our earthly existence.

Nature, (i.e. the ecosphere) is home, with responsibilities for care

and affection and aesthetic concern that the word home implies. To be at home means
asking ourselves about our intentions of staying on, about care of the furnishings and their

maintenance, about sympathy for the other
occupants and their welfare. These are all
matters with powers to initiate fundamental
revolution in the practice of our arts and sciences and in time becoming our second nature

as we prepare to minister to the natural home
place."

I think a paradigm shift like this will

One of tbefatbers of epidemiology, Sir Austin

Bradford Hills, wrote tbat all scienti c work is in
complete, wbetber it is observational orexperimental.

All scientific work is liable to be upset or modi ed by
advancing knowledge. Tbat does not confer upon us
tbe freedom to ignore tbe knowledge tbat we already
bave, or to postpone tbe action it appears to demand

atanygim time-

affect our viewpointfrom which we assess the
weight of evidence. As a society we must de
cide on the appropriate standards of proof for causality and the existence of adverse effects.
At the moment we have the cancer population standard, which is one case in one million.
There is a public health standard, which is one in 10,000 to one in 100. The doctor s

standard is between onein 10, and one in a 100. The legal standard for proof of causality
is greater than 50%. The scienti c standard is greater than 95%, which is biased towards
the prevention of acceptance errors rather than rejection errors. We must decide

whether to use one of these criterion or one that is based on ethics, knowledge, experience

and concern for the biosphere.

In environmental decisionmaking, it is preferable to have lots of data, but in the end

we have to use experience. Scientists have traditionally been obsessed with not being wrong
in reporting that some phenomenon Was occurring or that it was caused by some factor.
Contrary to present administrative practice, in environmental decisionmaking it would be

preferable to take action aimed at protecting or restoring a resource based on an erroneous

causal relationship than to delay the decision for one or two decades and thereby risk losing
the entire resource.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DAUBERT CASE
Professor Margaret A. Berger
Brooklyn Law School
Brooklyn, New York

I m here, I assume, to speak about the legal standard of causation and the impact, if

any, of the Supreme Court s recent decision in Daubert v. Merre/l Dow P/mrmaccutira/s
which was decided on June 28, the very last day of the Supreme Court s 92 93 term. This
is the first time that the Supreme Court has ever considered what the standard should be
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. The court was faced with a case in which the

central issue was causation. The litigation arose out of the use of the drug Bendectin, which
for a while was the leading morning sickness remedy for women. Bendectin was approved

by the FDA (US. Food and Drug Administration), and never lost its approval, although it
was eventually taken off the market by the manufacturer because of the more than 2,000
lawsuits that were ultimately brought. These charged that Bendectin caused birth defects,

primarily limb reduction defects. So about 2,000 cases arose from the more than 20 or 30
million births to mothers who took Bendectin.

The central issue in all of these cases was causation. Interestingly enough by the time
this case came to the Supreme Court, only one plaintiff had ultimately managed to win and
even that plaintiff has never been paid. In the remaining cases, juries either found for the

manufacturer or the trial court set aside jury verdicts for the plaintiff, or even if the trial judge
allowed a jury verdict for the plaintiff to stand, the appellate court had set aside the verdict.

By the time the Daubert case - which was a case coming out of the Ninth Circuit in
California -- had to be decided, there were all these other cases rejecting proof of causa
tion. The trial judge in Daubert granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. In other
words, on the basis of af davits submitted by experts for the plaintiffs and the defendant,
the trial judge found that the defendant would not be able to succeed as a matter of law.
The case went up to the Ninth Circuit, the three-judge appellate court, which in a very
summary opinion by Judge Kozinski said: first, the appropriate standard to apply was the
general acceptance standard of what the scientific community agreed on, the so called
Frye standard that came from a 1920 case dealing with lie detectors, and second, pursuant

to that standard, plaintiffs expert testimony wouldn t have been admissible because it hadn t
been peer reviewed. Therefore the Ninth Circuit concluded that it would throw the case
out and affirm the grant of summary judgment.
This went to the Supreme Court, probably in part because what the judge said in affirming was so much broader than what needed to be said to dispose of the case. By sug-

gesting that no scientific evidence would ever be admissible unless it had been peer reviewed

and by also suggesting that the only test was general acceptance, the judge was perhaps
overly broad in his analysis. Anyway, the Supreme Court took certiorari (a writ to call up
the records of an inferior court) and the case was argued before the Supreme Court. There

was enormous interest in the case and 22 amirus briefs were filed. Groups with an interest
in science, as well as members of the corporate bar, the plaintiff s bar, and persons inter
ested in issues of state versus federal law all somehow managed to find a basis for writing a
brief in Dauéert. I also wrote an arm'qu brief on behalf of the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology and Government.

Interestingly enough, by the time the case was actually argued in the Supreme Court,
and I was at the oral argument, neither side was arguing exactly those issues that the Su-

preme Court had certified for review. Neither side was really saying that all evidence that
is to be admitted has to be peer reviewed and neither side had a good word to say for the

Frye general acceptance test. What it really boiled down to between the plaintiffs and the
defendant was that the plaintiffs were saying: we have qualified experts. There is no con

tention in this case that the experts were not qualified. They have perfectly valid degrees,

they have terrific CVs (curricula vitae), they all had experience in the fields in which they

purport to be experts. The plaintiffs were saying that once you have an expert like that, an

'

expert with credentials, the court has to allow such an expert to testify. The defendants
were saying that s not enough -- there has to be a foundational inquiry before a court will

allow an expert witness to testify, an inquiry as to whether the expert has a theory that has

been sufficiently validated to be of assistance to the court in this case.

The result in Daubert was that the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary

judgment, meaning that the plaintiffs get another chance, but I do not think that the plain

tiffs will ultimately succeed. The Supreme Court said that there is a gatekeeping function
for the federal judge
that the judge must make a determination before the judge allows a
qualified expert to testify. Now that, of course, brings us to the crux of Daubert. What will
that determination consist of? What is it that the expert has to be able to say? Well this is
also where the court s opinion gets a little vague and Daubert certainly is not the end of all
discussion on how a court makes this determination on the admissibility of scienti c expert
testimony. You can t have a magic formula for this kind of a case.
What I think is important are some of the things that the court acknowledged in the
course of reaching its decision. One was that it recognized that there are questions for

judges, and other questions for scientists, and that the judge is not to just look at the scientific product and say, do I agree with the results? Do I now agree that Bendectin does or
does not cause birth defects? Rather, the

judge should seek to ascertain whether the

expert employed a proper methodology in
reaching his or her conclusion. Is what the
expert did or rened 0 in reaching his 01' her
Opinion in this case consonant With a SCien'
tific method? A court must at least be able to
see, if the expert is claiming that tests reveal

such and such, whether there really were

Tbis went to tbe Supreme Court, probably in part be-

cause wbat tbe judge said in a irming was so mucb
broader tban wbat needed to be said to dispose oftbe
case. By suggesting tbat no scienti c evidence would
ever be admissible unless it bad been peer reviewed
and by also suggesting tbat tbe only test was general
acceptance, tbejudge wasperbaps overly broad in bis
analysis.

tests? How were those tests done? What was
the rate of error in the tests? Those are the
kinds of issues that a court must look at.

One of the other Bendectin cases, the DeLuca case, was decided in a different circuit;

the Third. That circuit had also reversed a grant of summary judgment for defendant and

had said to the trial judge, we don t have enough of an explanation here as to why you think

there is something wrong with the expert proof. When the trial judge went back and brought

in the experts, and had an evidentiary hearing, some very interesting matters turned up. The

.

plaintiff s principal expert could not account for some of the gures that he had said he was
relying on. It turned out, for instance, that he had plugged in numbers from intermediate
studies by authors who subsequently had nalized their epidemiological studies and corrected
their original numbers. He had calculated risk ratios for studies that hadn t put down any
risk ratios and he could not explain to the court how he had gotten to those risk ratios now
that he was being asked specific questions. In addition, it turned out that the plaintiff 3 second expert, who did some reanalyses of data dependent on the numbers from the rst expert,
had never independently verified his numbers at all. So the trial judge in DeLuca, this other
Bendectin case, granted summary judgement again after he held this evidentiary hearing
when the case was sent back to him, and this time the circuit affirmed.

I

The Supreme Court in Daubert seems to me to have had a case like DeLuca in mind.
The court is really saying to the trial judge, it s not that you have to be a scientist and understand what this result is, but you can at least ensure that questions get asked about how
this scienti c work was actually done, before you allow an expert to express an opinion. If
the methodology was awed the expert proof must be excluded.
Second, the conclusion that comes out of Daubert is that the court recognizes that
science and law are different endeavours. If scientists are dissatisfied with the amount of

data that they have acquired, they can continue to ask questions, they can ask for another

research grant, they can continue questioning. The Supreme Court in the Daubert case rec-

ognizes that for better or worse, a court, when an issue is legally ready for determination,

must decide the question. It has no choice and the court says in Daubert,

There are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and
the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual

revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide ranging consideration of a multi

tude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so,

and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little
use, however, in the project of reaching a quick, final and binding legal judgment
often of great consequence - about a particular set of events in the past. We recognize that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations.
That is the conse
lfscientists are dissatisfied with the amount of data that they
have acquired, they can continue to ask questions, they can ask for

.
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Now where does this
leave us with Daubert? I

think the judges have been

given a number of messages.
one of the messages is that

they cannot duck responsibil

ity in some cases where con.
troversial scientific evidence is
being offered. They Wlll have to do their best to at least decide whether factors, such as for
instance, those shown by Glen Fox in the previous talk, were looked at by the experts. Did
they look at the consistency of results? Did they look at rates of errors? Did they have a

theory of plausibility? Exactly what is it that they did.> And the courts will have to reject
marginal evidence at times.

The court also suggests that there will be instances when scientific evidence will be
admissible but the court might still have to decide based on legal standards that it is insufficient to prove the plaintiff 5 position. The courts are obviously going to have to decide what
the legal standard is. I don t think it s at all clear at the moment. For example, one of the

things that the court could have done in Daubert is to have spoken about statistical significance. It chose not to do so. Whether at some point there will be an effort to translate

legal standards into statistical terms is at this point not at all clear. Lower courts and the
intermediate appellate courts are obviously going to have to deal with that issue.

Finally, there have been many, many panels on Daubert since the opinion came out.
In speaking to judges, the main impression I get is that they feel that they need to know a
lot more about the scienti c method. I think they will be turning to the scientific commu-

,

nity to

nd out, for instance, what are the hallmarks of a properly conducted epidemiologi-

cal study? What are problems with animal studies? How should one deal with the interrelationship between an animal study and an epidemiological study? Issues of causation are,
of course, not going to go away.
At bottom, the Bendectin litiga_
tion probably was a relatively easy case
bécause f1an 0f the CVideflCC POinth t0 1:

Finally, there have been many, many panels on Dauhert
sime the opinion came out. In speaking to judges, the main
impression I get is that theyfeel that they need to know a lot

addition to which, and I think that this

ing to the scientific community to nd out,for instance, what

causation m a very meanmgful war In
is what ultimately impressed jurors and

1

more about the scientific method. [think they will be turn-

are the hallmarks ofa properly conducted epidemiological

judges, the defendant started doing
some very sophisticated work showing
study? What areproblems with animal studies? How should
that in particular communities the rate
one deal with the interrelationship between an animal study
of birth defects rCmainCd the same 136'
and an epidemiological study? Issues of causation are, of
fore Bendectin was on the market. 0
course, mtgm-ng to go away.
course, it s also true that there are lots
of other substances out there that per
haps can cause birth defects, and none of these studies showed the courts exactly what else
was on the market at the same time that Bendectin was not and Bendectin was. But that is
the nature of the problem in these kinds of cases. So I would hope that those of you who

are scientists might have suggestions for the legal community on how to translate some of
the attempts you are making to distinguish between good science and bad science into cri
teria that the courts can utilize.

CHILDREN OF GREAT LAKES FISH CONSUMERS
Dr. Joseph Jacobson

Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan

For several years now my wife Sandra Jacobson and I have been doing research on a
cohort of children whose mothers ate relatively large quantities of Lake Michigan sh during the 19705. The children were bornin 1980 and 1981 and have been studied prospectively from birth. We are now completing an 11 year infant followup, but the only data
that are complete and that I can talk about today are for the infant to four-year followup
phases. Because we cannot experiment on these children and randomly assign them to dif

ferent exposure levels, the studies of course are correlational by de nition. The key feature
of the correlational method that was used is the control for potential confounding variables,
.

that is, to control for as many in uences on these developmental outcomes as possible. The
objective was to determine the degree to which the prenatal exposure to PCBs
(polychlorinated biphenyls), which was the major contaminant in Lake Michigan sh at the
time, may have affected developmental outcomes. We were looking primarily at intellectual and cognitive development, although we also looked at behavioral development and
physical growth.
In the 19705, Harold Humphrey of the Michigan Public Health Department had

found elevated PCB levels in blood sampled from Lake Michigan shermen and a moder
ate correlation between the amount of Lake Michigan sh that the sherman ate and the

I

level of PCBs in their blood. It is clear that consumption of these sh was a major source
of PCBs for the

shermen. On the other hand, there was no evidence of health effects or

physical anomalies. Our study was undertaken in response to an initiative of Dr. Wayland
Swain, who was director of the US. EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) Large

Lakes Research Station at Grosse Ile at the time. Swain surmised that, even if the adult
shermen were not affected, infants and children might be more vulnerable to this kind of

exposure, especially if the exposure was to the fetus in utero.

The study began in July 1980 and lasted over a 16-month period. Over 8,000 women
were interviewed in four major maternity hospitals located near Lake Michigan. They were
asked in detail about the Lake Michigan sh they had eaten during the prior year, species
by species. If they had eaten more sh in the past, they were asked about that period as
well. We came up with a summary measure of contaminated
defined as the annual Lake Michigan

sh consumption, which we

sh consumption, in the present or past, whichever

was greater. The nal sample included 313 infants, of whom 242 were from families where
the mother reported elevated levels of Lake Michigan sh consumption, and 71 were from

families near Lake Michigan where the mothers had not eaten Great Lakes sh.
Even though we recruited both

sh eaters and non

sh eaters in the sample, I have

to emphasize that the study was not designed as a comparison between an exposed group
and a control group because everyone in western industrial countries, such as ours, is going
to have some levels of PCBs in his or her body. What we were measuring in the studies
was prenatal PCB exposure, and you do not have to eat Lake Michigan sh to become ex
posed to PCBs. In fact, we found elevated PCB levels in some instances in mothers who
ate no Lake Michigan sh. Although it is clear that eating Lake Michigan sh during the
19705 increased your risk for high levels of PCB exposure, there were, and continue to be,

other routes of PCB exposure.

The primary index of prenatal exposure was from umbilical cord blood samples from
a subset of the children. Because PCBs have a long half-life in biological tissue, the cordserum can give you a record of in utero exposure. We were also interested in postnatal exposure through breast feeding because PCBs are lipophilic and concentrate in breast milk.

We wanted to assess the degree to which exposure from breast feeding might put the child

at risk. The level of PCBs in the breast milk and the amount of breast milk consumed by
the infants were used to estimate how much of the contaminated milk the infant consumed.

In our four year followup study, we also got levels of the child PCB body burden from

blood serum samples.

The blood and breast milk samples were analyzed by packed column gas chromatog
raphy at the Michigan Department of Public Health. We were using the Webb McCall
method based on total PCBs. We did not have the technology at that time to evaluate spe-

ci c PCB congeners, and the data that I will be reporting today are based on total PCBs.

We know that individual PCB congeners differ considerably in terms of their toxicity and

the kinds of effects they will have on biological systems. Unfortunately, we have no basis

for speculating about which congeners may have been responsible for the effects that we
saw. The children who were exposed to higher levels of PCBs were also exposed to higher

levels of dioxin and dibenzofurans, and it could be actually those contaminants, which cooccur with PCBs in the environment, that were responsible for the effects that we saw. I

am going to talk about PCB exposure, but we probably should consider our PCB measure
as a marker for an environmental exposure, since the precise chemical composition is not

yet known.

Infants were assessed at birth, at seven months and at four years. As I said in my
introduction, the biggest problem in this kind of human correlational study, or any human
exposure study, is the risk of spurious correlation. Because subjects cannot be randomly assigned to control for potential confounding in uences, the strategy was to measure as many
other factors as possible, known or suspected to affect the outcomes being studied and then

to control for those other in uences statistically. Twenty-four potentially confounding in-

uences were included as control variables that were measured in connection with the fouryear followup study. These included prenatal exposure to alcohol, maternal smoking during
pregnancy, mother s age, sex of infant, perinatal medical complications, mother s IQ,
HOME Inventory, which assesses the quality of intellectual stimulation provided by the
parent, familial stress, and so forth. Since all of these could impact on the intellectual and
behavioral development of the children, they were all measured.
Our statistical strategy is based on the premise that a third variable, a possible

confounder, cannot be the true cause of an observed deficit unless it is related both to the

exposure and to the outcome. We selected control variables based on those known or suspected to affect the outcome. We then controlled statistically for all the potential
confounders that related, even weakly, to exposure using a criterion of p >O.10 so that any
third variable that was even weakly related to exposure was controlled statistically in all the
analyses. In all the results that I will be reviewing with you today, atoxic effect was in
ferred only if the exposure was associated with the outcome after controlling for any poten

tial confounder weakly related to the exposure. In addition, in this research all of the indi
viduals involved in testing the infants and children were blind, that is they were unaware

of the fish consumption and biological measure of exposure for the infant.

When we looked at prenatal PCB exposure, there were only three control variables

that were relevant. The first two of these were very weakly correlated with prenatal expo-

sure: mother s age and gravidity. Where the mothers were older, they had accumulated

more PCBs in their body, and therefore passed on more to their fetuses. Gravidity is like
maternal age: the women who had been pregnant more times were older and had accumu-

lated more PCBs. There was also a correlation with examiner, which we have to assume

was due to chance. These three variables were controlled for in all analyses of the effects of
prenatal PCB exposure.
'
With four-year serum PCB levels,
there was actually a positive correlation with
socio-economic status (SES). The higher
SES children have higher PCB levels at age
four. That makes PCBs very unusual because
most risk factors, such as lead and alcohol, in
our society are more concentrated in the lower
social classes. The higher SES mothers breast
fed longer and passed more PCBs to their
children postnatally through the breast milk.
It was the four year-old children from the
more highly educated mothers, who had breast fed
burdens.

E'ven tbougb we recruited botb sb eaters and non
sb eaters in tbe sample, I [save to empbasize tbat tbe
study was not designed as a comparison between an
exposed group and a control group because everyone
in western industrial countries, sucb as ours, is going

to bave some levels quCBs in bis or ber body. Wbat
we were measuring in tbe studies was prenatal PCB
exposure, and you do not bane to eat Lake Micbigan
sb to become exposed to PCBs.

longer, who had the heavier PCB body

The levels of PCBs in the cord blood were very low, which was not surprising given

that PCBs are lipophilic and cord blood is very lean. Unfortunately two-thirds of these
samples were below the laboratory s detection limits, which means that we could not get a

very reliable assessment of exact quantity on a large proportion of these samples. The effect
of being close to the detection limit means that we have an increased risk of a Type II error;
that means that there may be some real effects that are difficult to detect because we have
not been able to measure the exposure as accurately as might be necessary. And in some
cases where we detect effects we may be understating them because of the problems with
the reliability of the measure. The levels were considerably higher in the maternal milk and

so with the maternal milk PCB level, we have a more reliable assessment. About half of

the four year old children had detectable serum PCB levels that actually approached those

of their mothers. These children were virtually always'children who had breast fed, and

those who were breast fed over six, 12 months, or some cases 18 months were exposed to
quite heavy doses of PCBs. We did an analysis to examine the determinants of the fouryear PCB levels. Prenatal exposures were small and, as the child grew, that very small

amount that crossed the placenta became virtually undetectable in the blood. The cord
serum measure was unrelated to the measure of PCB body burden at four years. Instead, it
was maternal milk PCB levels and duration of breast feeding which proved to be the principal determinants of the four year PCB levels.
Turning to the effects on physical growth, we found that both higher cord serum

PCB level and consumption of Lake Michigan sh predicted smaller birth weight, smaller
head circumference, and reduced gestational age. The relationship was dose dependent.

These effects on birth size were consistent with reports from Japan and Taiwan in which
children were exposed prenatally to much higher levels of PCBs and related contaminants
from maternal consumption of PCB contaminated rice oil. There have also been studies of
occupationally exposed women, working in capacitor plants in the U.S. and Japan, whose
infants were reported to be smaller at birth. And there was one general population study in
Japan, where female infants were shown to be smaller at birth in more heavily exposed
mothers. Although the effects we saw on birth size were statistically signi cant, we do not
think they were clinically signi cant. The absolute birth size de cits were very small, rang
ing from 160 to 250 grams, which are similar to those you find with children of mothers
who smoke during pregnancy. But the important difference is that infants exposed
prenatally by smoking grow faster over the rst ve or six months and tend to catch up.
When we remeasured the children in our study at ve months, they were still small, and
the prenatal PCB exposure still predicted smaller size at ve months. Even at four years,
we found a weight de cit, in that the children who were exposed prenatally weighed, on

average, 1.8 kilograms less. The evidence of persistent weight de cits is again consistent

with the evidence from the Taiwan exposure. In addition, there is a laboratory study of rat

pups which showed persistent size de cits associated with prenatal PCB exposure. Simi

larly, the general population study with female Japanese children, showed persistent weight

de cits into childhood. The effect we have seen on physical growth is related only to pre
natal exposure. There was no apparent effect on the physical growth of the children ex
posed to much higher levels of PCBs postnatally by breast feeding.
In terms of cognitive development during infancy, the principal

nding was that the

more highly exposed infants exhibited poor visual recognition memory at seven months.
The test of visual recognition memory was a new test called the Pagan Test, in which the
infant is seated on the mother s lap in front of an observation chamber. The observer
watches through a peep hole and observes the infant s gaze; whether the infant is looking to
the left or to the right. The infant is initially shown two identical photos for 20 seconds to
give him/her a chance to encode them in memory. The familiar photo is then paired with a
novel one. The normal response is to look longer at the novel photo since the infant has
seen the familiar one and will now nd it boring. If the infant does look longer at the new

one, we can infer that the infant has encoded the initial one in memory, is able to retrieve it
from memory, and is able to discriminate between the two photos. Thus, if the infant pre
fers the new photo, we can infer that there is some very basic aspect of cognitive processing

that is intact. Cord serum PCB and maternal sh consumption levels were both associated
with poorer performance on this test. Infants exposed prenatally to higher levels tended not
to prefer the new photo. The effect was highly dose dependent. If you look at the highest
exposed infants, you can see that their preference for the new picture is at 50%; they show

essentially no preference for the new picture. This suggests that there is some aspect of encoding information into short-term memory that they are having trouble with due to prenatal exposure to these contaminants. As with physical growth, postnatal exposure from
breast feeding had no effect on cognitive performance in this test.

At age four, the principal test that we used was the McCarthy Scales, which is like
an IQtest for preschool children. It is often dif cult to elicit cooperation when you are
trying to test a four-year-old and, if an uncooperative child gets a low score, you cannot
know if that is due to the fact that they are not competent or they are just not in the mood
to do the things you are trying to get them to do. We set a criterion to identify the noncooperative children. Any child who failed to respond to all, or all but one of the items on

any of 17 designated subtests was considered non-cooperative. By this criterion, 7.2% of
the children were non cooperative due to incomplete data, and their data were excluded
from the analysis. Looking at the remaining children, what we found was that prenatal
PCB exposure was associated with poorer performance on the McCarthy Verbal and
Memory Scales, with an effect just short of statistical signi cance on the Qiantitative Scale.
The strongest effect was on the memory scale and it was principally on two subtests: verbal
memory, which assesses recall for strings of words, sentences and a story, and numerical
memory, sometimes called forward and backward digit span, which tests the child s ability
to repeat strings of numbers, both in the order dictated and then in reverse order. The ef

fects on both the verbal scale and the memory scale were dose dependent.

We gave another short term memory test at age four. In this test the child was
shown an array of one or three drawings on a computer screen and then asked to remember
it. The child was then shown a series of drawings one by one and told to push a button
whenever the stimulus on the screen came from the original memory set. Here we found
another dose dependent effect of prenatal PCB exposure. The highest exposed children
made considerably more errors, giving another indication of some problems in short-term

measure.

memory processing ability in relation to the prenatal exposure

Given the relatively heavy postnatal exposure from breast feeding, we certainly were

anxious to see if there was any relationship between breast feeding exposure and these same
outcome measures. When we looked at the McCarthy Scales, we found that there was a

negative correlation between maternal milk PCB level and memory performance, for both

verbal memory and numerical memory. However, a longer duration of breast feeding was
associated with better memory and also better verbal performance. This positive correlation with duration of breast feeding was due to more optimal intellectual stimulation by the
mothers who breast fed. Breast feeding was more common in the higher social class, better

educated mothers who had higher IQscores and gave more optimal stimulation as indicated
on the HOME Inventory.

One measure of postnatal exposure suggests a de cit; the other measure suggests better performance. To further investigate this, we broke the milk PCB measure down into

ve levels and breast feeding down into three levels (see Table I). If you look rst at the

bottom row of the table, you can see that the effect is seen only in the highest exposed children. It is only where the mothers had 1.25 parts per million or more PCBs in their milk
that we saw the memory de cit. If you look at the right-hand column, the longer they

breast fed the better the children did. The key column is the one labelled 1250-2600.
Looking across the rows the children in that column consistently did most poorly. But, as

Table 1

Duration

McCarthy Memory Scale scores (adjusted for potential confounders)
by maternal milk PCB level and duration of nursing.
(from f. Pediatrics 1990; 116: 38-45; by permission)

Breast Milk PCB Level (ng/ml)

750-999 1000-1249 1250 2600

Mean

185 -499

500-749

0 3.0

57.9

49.4

48.3

49.1

42.7

49.5

3.1 9.0

54.3

I 56.4

51.2

53.8

44.6

52.1

91-180

52.5

58.0

61.7

55.4

47.2

54.9

Mean

54.9

54.6

53.8

52.7

44.8

of Nursing (mo.)

(2)

(5)

(7)

(10)

(10)

(10)

(6),

(11)

(8)

(4)

(7)

(4)

(2)

(3)

(5)

you go down the column, even in this highest exposed group, the longer the children breast
fed, the better they did. The key here is the fact that the mothers with more PCBs in their
breast milk also had more PCBs in their blood and therefore, also transmitted more PCBs

to their infants prenatally. So the infants in this column were exposed more, both prenatally
and postnatally. The lower scores that we are seeing in this column, are due not to the post
natal exposure that these children are getting, but to the greater prenatal exposure they are
getting. The group with a mean score of 47.2 is the group with the highest postnatal expo
sure. Since they did better than the other groups in that column with less postnatal exposure the deficit seems to be attributable to the fact that all the children in that column got
higher prenatal exposure. We conclude that it is not how much contaminated milk the
child ingested, but rather how highly exposed the mother was to start with.
Given that the deficit in infancy could have been due to impaired visual discrimina-

tion, as well as impaired memory, we also looked at visual discrimination at age four. The
test we used is an old test, called the Matching Familiar Figures Test, but we redesigned it

to look at both visual discrimination and the speed at which the information is processed.

In this test the child was asked to identify which of the two stimuli on the bottom of a picture was identical to the one at the top. There were 24 sets of pictures. We recorded how

long it took the child to Come up with an answer and then, if the child gave the correct

answer, we would ask why the other picture was wrong. These data generated three summary measures: i) how many of the 24 problems the child got right; ii) average time to
respond on all the problems; and iii) average time to respond on the problems for which the

child got the right answer for the right reason. We took the third of these, our measure of

visual discrimination processing speed. On this measure, the strongest effects were with the
maternal milk PCB levels. Where the mothers had higher PCB levels in their milk the
children responded more slowly, that is, it took them more time to come up with correct
answers. The cord blood PCB effect fell short of statistical significance but was in the same
direction. Again, duration of breast feeding led to more optimal performance, thus, the ef
fect of maternal milk PCB level appears to be because of the prenatal, rather than postnatal
exposure.
We beliesue tbe data indicate diminisbed potential.
All of tbesefour-year olds seem to be performing
witbin tbe normal range, but tbe bigber exposed
cbildren seem not to be doing as well as tbey otber
wise would [MW in tbe absence oftbis exposure.

-

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize
three points about our data. One, the defi

cits in physical growth and short-term
memory that we have found to date were all
specifically related to prenatal exposure.
Even though much larger quantities of PCBs
are transferred postnatally by breast feeding,

there appears to be markedly greater vulner

ability when the exposure occurs m utero. There are several possible mechanisms to explain
this phenomenon. We know that migratory cells and cells undergoing mitosis in the prena-

tal period are particularly sensitive to toxic insult. There is a blood-brain barrier that pro-

tects the brain, but it is not formed until shortly before birth. And there are drug metabolizing capacities that do not develop in the prenatal period but will help the infant deal with
postnatal toxic exposures.

I would also like to emphasize that the magnitude of the de cits that we saw was
modest. There was no evidence of mental retardation or gross impairment, and yet, if you
think of Glen Fox s criteria of consistency of the evidence, we were impressed that the effect appears to have been sufficiently robust to disrupt short term memory in different domains and in different modalities; verbal and quantitative auditory memory on the

McCarthy Scale at age four, visual memory for pictures on the Fagan Test in infancy and on

the computer test at four years. We believe the data indicate diminished potential. All of

these four year olds seem to be performing within the normal range, but the higher exposed
children seem not to be doing as well as they otherwise would have in the absence of this
exposure.

I have been quoted in the press as having said that our ndings have no clinical sig
nificance. I have said that the physical growth effects that we saw have no apparent clinical
signi cance, but the short-term memory de cits may be quite signi cant for later cognitive
development. Relatively subtle de cits in short term memory or attention could have a
marked impact on the child s abilityto master basic reading and arithmetic skills in school.
It is possible that subtle de cits in cognitive processing ability could become magni ed if
the child has trouble acquiring basic skills, becomes labelled as a slow learner, and lags as a
result. Alternatively, it is conceivable that in the structure of the school environment the

children could outgrow these de cits with increased school experience. That is why we are
proceeding on our 11-year followup to try to get a better picture of the longer term implications for the relatively subtle deficits that we have seen postnatally and at age four.

BASIS FOR REMOVING BIOLOGICALLY ACTIVE
PERSISTENT TOXIC SUBSTANCES
Dr. William Owens

Procter and Gamble Company
Cincinnati, Ohio

Ladies and gentlemen, this workshop is devoted to a discussion of how to achieve a

weight of the evidence for evaluating environmental risks. This discussion continues to be

emotional. For industry, there exists a perception of excessive nancial burden; for the en-

vironmental community, there exists a perception of hesitation and the burden of inaction.
Above all, there is a societal need for sound decisions, not guess work. Today, I will be presenting the results of a three year environmental study on a Canadian river, where a

bleached kraft pulp mill has discharged ef uent for the past 18 years. Setting aside the

emotions of the past few days, I would like to look at the costs, human resources, time and
outcome of this study - because I believe it exempli es both the dif culties and the opportunities, gaining broad stakeholder agreement on the meaning of the ecosystem study. It
also has aspects of the reverse onus as industry initiated the study, and, as a mill ef uent,
the assessment of complex mixtures is addressed.

In 1988, after over 15 years of operation of using chlorine gas, the Grande Prairie

mill was, like many pulp mills in 1988, faced with the following situation: the 2,3,7,8 con

geners of dioxin and furan were present in the mill ef uent in parts per quadrillion, and they

were also found in

sh near the mill in parts per trillion. At that time, the environmental

implications for the river ecosystem were unknown.
It was decided to proceed along two paths:

1. The process was to be changed between 1988 and 1992; highly chlorinated organics
were to be reduced by removing both chlorine gas and hypochlorite from the mill operation, using increased cooking, pressure diffusers, oxygen and peroxide reinforce
ment, and 100% chlorine dioxide substitution.

2. A comprehensive environmental assessment of the river system was to be conducted
with two objectives: To assess whether the mills operation was having an adverse ef
fect on the receiving river s biology and to establish a baseline for evaluating future
operations.

Analyses of the mill ef uent as process changes were implemented showed a steady
reduction in the formation of dioxin and furan. The ef uent has been non-detect with the
change to 100% chlorine dioxide -- with detection limits from 2 5 parts per quadrillion
since July 1992. So the process changes achieved their primary goal. Similar non-detects
for polychlorinated phenolics have been demonstrated in monthly analysis at detection lim
its of .01 ppb.
Now let s proceed by reviewing background information on the site and the key concepts of the study design. We were fortunate to have had performed 20 years of benthic
macroinvertebrate monitoring; including a preoperational baseline. These data were impor
tant to focusing the study effort as we will see in a minute. However, there were data gaps
on the environmental transport of ef uent compounds and on the health of fish species.
Baseline data are often lacking
and every attempt should be made to find baseline data
or estimates of baseline conditions.
The analysis of the total numbers of benthic macroinvertebrates found in specific

classes showed that the pollution sensitive E-P T (Ephemeroptera, Plecoptera, Trichoptera)

group is relatively stable at all stations, even below the mill. However, there is a rise in
oligochaetes below the municipal discharge and again below the mill. Below Bear Creek,

where surface runoff from the city of Grande Prairie enters the river, there are some addi

tional changes. These results are consistent with an organic and nutrient enrichment pat
tern from several sources and with no evidence for fundamental, adverse impacts
these
data were critical to eliminate the major confounder of eutrophication impacts and allowed
us to concentrate on filling in the needed chemistry and the fisheries biology. Addressing
confounders is of critical importance in achieving a broadly accepted weight of the evidence
upon which regulators will act and the public will accept.
Our overall study design concept was to look for adverse effects and to attempt to
correlate any ndings with chemical exposure. A major strength of the study is to use multiple parameters to determine both exposure and environmental effects. As you will quickly
see, our ecosystem study includes data on the discharge, water and sediments, invertebrate
and fish body burdens. We have also tested numerous biomarkers for usefulness, in addi
tion to organismal level and fish population measures in addition to the benthic data. Thus,

a comprehensive effort was undertaken to gain a consensus from stakeholders using a weight
of the evidence basis.
The mill, located in Grande Prairie, Alberta, is on the Wapiti/ Smoky River system.

The study area went to the con uence with the Peace River, where the Diashowa mill had
just started operation. Previous research indicated that fish species in this environment could
be relatively mobile, so the reference area chosen was on the North Saskatchewan River system which does not have a bleached kraft mill and is free of major industrial activity.
There are a variety of important habitat differences in the study area. The Wapiti is

fed by snow melt and glaciers in the Rockies -- it falls sharply through the foothills

-

which defines one habitat region of the river. Then in the atter agricultural and forest
lands around Grande Prairie and for about 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) below the mill, the

Wapiti forms a second habitat region. In the larger Smoky

which runs nearly 200

kilometers (124 miles) to the Peace
is a third habitat region, especially in regard to high
natural silt loads which affect both benthic and fish populations. Each habitat represents a

change which may affect fish populations or biomarkers, and must be recognized for proper
interpretation. Sampling sites are 1) above the municipal sewage outfall, 2) between the
sewage outfall and the mill, 3) within 5 km (3.1 miles) of the discharge, 4) from 5 km (3.1

miles) downstream of the discharge to the Smoky and 5) sites near Watino and the conflu

ence with the Peace. Two other sites are the fish spawning areas studied: first, the longnose
sucker spawns in smaller side streams in the spring. Big Mountain Creek is a confirmed
spawning site. Second, the first confirmed mountain Whitefish spawning area to be studied
-- at Wapiti Gardens -- the mountain Whitefish is a fall broadcast spawner.
'

The ecosystem itself presents a challenge to sh species, in addition to major temperature uctuations with the ice cover during the winter and the peak ow during summer
oods. A flood in 1990 was particularly extreme, but major uctuations occur annually.
This required a multi-seasonal sampling program -- with some focus on the fall low- ow
events when exposure would be high -- again trying to anticipate what times were most im-

portant to achieving a sound andaccepted weight of the evidence for this site.

A variety of parameters were used to document the habitat types and to de ne river
regions and our reference site. Ultimately, the data showed that the reference site t the
upstream portion of Wapiti more closely than the downstream portion; a recognition necessary for proper interpretation.
Chemical analyses were performed during the study with emphasis on chlorinated or

ganics. The abiotic and the biotic compartments tested included the water column, deposited and suspended sediments, benthic invertebrates, and both sh muscle and sh bile.

The fish measurements were largely on individuals, not composites -- this is necessary to
test for dose correlations between chemical body burden and the biological observations.
This was done to eliminate a prime de ciency in many studies: lack of exposure and dose

data, usually due to the high analytical costs involved. However, exposure is one of the most

vital aspects of eld research, as any toxicologist knows, the dose makes the poison.

On the biological side, various parameters were measured at the population level for

the sh community,especially for two target species: the mountain White sh and the
longnose sucker. As we will see, the mountain White sh have the greatest exposure to potentially bioaccumulating compounds. Further, the population level is quite important, as
there is common agreement that adverse effects, when present, can be clearly measured at
the population level.

At the individual level, various
measures were taken for several sh
species, but again concentrating particularly on the longnose sucker and
the mountain White sh. Several parameters such as histology are also
widely accepted. Measurements of

reproductive capacity and success

should be central to initial environ
mental assessments. The biomarker
tests employed during the study in-

Tbe sb measurements were largely on individuals, not com
posites - this is necessary to testfor dose correlations between
cbemical body burden and tbe biological observations. Tbis
was done to eliminate a prime de ciency in many studies:
lack cyfexfosure and dose data, usually due to tbe big/.7 analyti
cal costs involved. However; exposure is one oftbe most vital
aspects of eld research, as any toxicologist knows,
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makes tbepoison.
~

»

eluded a relatively large set of measurements -- again, most often on the longnose sucker
and the mountain white sh
but various tests were also conducted on other species such
as burbot and walleye. In this class of measures, it should be noted that there is far less
scienti c and regulatory consensus on what constitutes an adverse effect. Therefore, interpretation and use are far less clear.
The results, beginning at the population level and working downward, show repre-

sentative sheries abundance data from shing efforts in 1991. Target species, the longnose

sucker and the mountain White sh, are numerous enough for adequate sample sizes. At the
population level, the Wapiti has a diverse sheries population indicating a lack of adverse
effects from the mill ef uent. This is consistent with the historic benthic and the habitat
data. Obviously, the reference site, consistent with the habitat observations, is more of a
mountain White sh stream, and is a less hospitable habitat for suckers.

A key measure of population health is growth. Therefore, scales or bone structures

were taken for aging with weight and length to calculate growth. The mountain White sh
in the Wapiti grows at the same overall rate as the reference stream. Like the population
data, this is an accepted indication of no adverse effect from the discharge.

I

When one compares the lipid adjusted dioxin body burdens across sh species in
1990-91, there is a very startling nding. Longnose sucker, a bottom feeder, and burbot, an

omnivore, and walleye, a predator, had comparable TCDD body burden ranges. The
mountain White sh, however, had uniquely elevated levels on a lipid adjusted basis. Simple

water column bioaccumulation or sediment contact could not account for the values in this
specres.

This startling difference in lipid adjusted body burdens was followed with an analyses
of dietary food chain niches based on stomach contents. These results lead to a schematic
model indicating that suspended sediments from the mill are the apparent transport mechanism for TCDD. Benthic organisms lter-feeding on these suspended sediments are the
primary link to consumers higher in the food chain. As consumption of filter feeders is un

even between species, mountain white sh consumption elevates body levels. This model

was a key step in establishing a weight of the evidence - providing the scienti c basis for
and as a salmonid, the mountain White sh is also prethe most highly exposed species
sumed to be a very sensitive species. This also provides a general model for hydrophobic
compounds from the mill to enter the food web.
A standard template required that the eld crew record a complete data set for each

individual sh captured, which included the gross pathology eld record for the two target

species. We found that external and internal parasite loads and parasite types were similar
between the Wapiti and the reference. External secondary sexual characteristics were similar

between sites for both species during spawning runs, contrasting with adverse ndings at Jacksh Bay in eastern Canada. External lesions such as n rot were rarely found, and were not
elevated in the mill population. Net, no gross physical deformities were found in Wapiti sh.

Histology was performed on liver, kidney, spleen and gonads and there was no evi

dence for major organ pathologies between the Wapiti sh and the reference samples. No

evidence for tumors, neoplasia or preneoplasia were found. Occasional local areas of liver

damage

hepatic focal necrosis -- were observed in conjunction with liver parasites, but at

similar frequencies between exposed and reference sh. We also observed some bile duct
proliferation in the suckers (and not the more heavily exposed mountain White sh). To resolve the issue, llet and bile burdens of mill compounds were tested against bile prolifera
tion. There was no apparent relationship with mill exposure. Thus, the individual measures of exposure showed their worth and value.

As noted, a primary focus of our research was sh reproduction. Reproduction is vi
tal to a species and represents a complex biochemistry, susceptible to chemical toxicants; it

is a critical endpoint to evaluate for a sound weight of the evidence conclusion. Initial ob
servations were on gonad size which is not signi cantly different in either species for eiand also the age at which sh become sexually mature. Here again, we have no
ther sex
statistically signi cant differences, but slight trends to earlier maturity at the exposed site,
in contrast to ndings of delayed maturity at some mill sites in Scandinavia and eastern
Canada.

Finally, sh reproductive hormones were measured from blood serum using
radioimmunoassays. At several eastern Canadian sites, there has been some evidence the
sh near both bleached and unbleached mills have lower hormone levels. We have analyzed
for estradiol, testosterone and 17,20-dihydroxyprogesterone, all critical in the control of the

reproductive cycle and spawning activity. To date, we see no differences between Wapiti

and reference suckers immediately before, during, or after the spawning run. However, an

early blizzard and river freeze up prevented the capture of mountain White sh during an at
tempt to evaluate their spawning run; so, climate and seasonal events often hamper data collection and may confound interpretation, and all stakeholders have to appreciate the vari
ability and dif culty of working in the eld.

Only one of numerous biomarkers showed a consistent difference during the study:

an inducible liver detoxi cation enzyme, EROD. This is one of a large family of P450 en-

zymes
whichbiotransform and metabolize various hydrophobic molecules. Mountain
Whitefish EROD is highly induced in a spatial relationship to the mill discharge. In con
trast, the longnose sucker induction above background was minor.
We have examined the induction both from a chemical exposure relationship and for
any correlation to adverse biological effects. There is with the mountain Whitefish an asso
ciation between induction and llet dioxin levels: as dioxin levels have fallen in fish with the

mill process changes, so has the degree of induction. However, no associations have been

found with other biological responses such as liver somatic index or with other parameters

such as sex steroids. Hence, EROD induction appears to be a marker of exposure and not
of adverse biological effects.

This work is being continued to build upon the design and its ndings. Dioxin and
P4501A trends are being monitored in mountain Whitefish in spring and fall samplings
every year. Additional sampling has taken place to monitor reproductive cycles with sex
steroid analyses. This fall suspended sediment and fish bile samples were taken to assess
other aspects of changes in exposure. Samples have been archived for either histology or
blood serum analyses if these should become necessary. Again, this is an effort to have both

exposure and biological response data for an adequate assessment to derive a weight of the
evidence.
This weight of the evidence approach has had very important results for the mill:

'

After three years of one year permit extensions, the mill received a five-year operating permit in 1992.

'

The regulators dropped a proposal to require oxygen delignification as there was a
sufficient demonstration of a lack of adverse effects.

'

Chlorine dioxide use was accepted.

'

Discussions have now begun on
lifting fish consumption advisories,
as we have demonstrated a fall in
dioxin body burdens below regulatory levels.

Now let s carefully look at this effort from the standpoint of what were

In summary, a weight oftbe evidence approacb is not a
simple task. Considerable e ort must be spent on solid,

tborougbly reviewed study designs to acbieve a weigbt
oft/1e evidence. Exposure validation and concurrent
measurement of biological responses are part of tbe
comprebensive measurements needed to satisfy
stakebola'ers.

the critical steps:

First, the design and the ongoing results were thoroughly reviewed before execution
with provincial and federal regulators and subjected to scientific peer review among both
U.S. and Canadian scientists. This careful review was critical to gain acceptance of the
study results and to ensure that important weight of the evidence factors were not omitted.
Second, a multi-disciplinary team was necessary including analytical chemists, mill

personnel, several fisheries biologists and the associated field team, fish endocrinologists, a

pathologist, a climate chemist, and a biochemist for liver analyses. Besides scientific serv-

ices, all team members contributed towards both the design and the data interpretation.

Third, to truly achieve a weight of the evidence, both chemical and biological measures of exposures had to be thoroughly investigated. Without the chemical data on fillet
and bile and the biological data on P4501A to provide an exposure assessment, few would

have accepted the overall biological conclusions that the ef uent was having no adverse im-

pacts on the ecosystem.

Fourth, there was a comprehensive assessment of the biological endpoints with built
in redundancy ~ in many cases, parameters were deliberately designed to reiterate other
tests -- so that weight of the evidence conclusion on reproduction had the complete sup
port of several measurements.
Finally, note the time
three years of intensive study - and the costs
approach
ing $3 million -- which are necessary to do a thorough job, just at one site. Plus the fact
that there is a continuing monitoring effort at the site. However, these costs are modest in

comparison to capital costs associated with further mill process changes, or the social and
economic costs associated with a possible mill closure were it based on assumptions that the
discharges were dangerous or causing environmental impacts.
In summary, a weight of the evidence approach is not a simple task. Considerable
effort must be spent on solid, thoroughly reviewed study designs to achieve a weight of the
evidence. Exposure validation and concurrent measurement of biological responses are part
of the comprehensive measurements needed to satisfy stakeholders. Finally, execution in
field studies is fraught with difficulty. We have encountered oods, blizzards, equipment
breakdowns, and other problems. Expectations of time, money and personnel have to be

realistic as to what can be achieved in a given time period.

SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Mr. Jack Weinberg
Greenpeace
Chicago, Illinois

and

Mr. Joe Thornton
Greenpeace
New York, NY

In 1993, the Governments of the United States and Canada accepted the Interna
tional Joint Commission s (IJC) recommendation to use a weight of evidence approach in

reaching conclusions about proposals to eliminate persistent toxic substances from the ecosystem. The IJC introduced this concept as part of its call for a precautionary set of environmental policies, including the use of the reverse onus approach to chemical regulations.
The IJC and governments must now more fully define the use and meaning of the term
weight of evidence approach as it is used in this context. We would like to share some
thoughts on the use of a weight of evidence approach for evaluating scientific information
in a precautionary policy setting.
Science and Policy
Few scientists would claim that science can establish final or ultimate truths. Rather,

science is a method and practice for seeking truth through aniterative process of formulat
ing, testing and revising theories and hypotheses. In a scientific setting, a practitioner seeks
evidence in order to strengthen or disprove a hypothesis she or he is actively testing. This
effort is part of a larger exercise inthe construction of a body of human knowledge.

Science and the knowledge it produces shouldinform public policy. On the other
hand, only in highly authoritarian societies do decisionmakers claim that public policy can
or should be derived entirely from science; in those societies, these claims serve primarily to
mystify and conceal. In democratic societies, we acknowledge that policy incorporates not
only scienti c inputs but also considerations of ethics, values and opinions, as well as the

interplay of con icting interests and perspectives.
In de ning a weight of evidence or precautionary approach to environmental
policy, the proper role of science is to generate theories and evidence, to suggest how these
can inform public policy, and to evaluate the validity and relevance of cited scientific infor
mation to the policy matter under consideration.
When good science informs policy, it increases the likelihood of a match between the

policy s stated goal and the actual outcome that occurs when the policy is put into practice.

Conversely, when policy consistently fails to achieve its stated goals, this calls into question
the policy s intellectual and scientific underpinnings.

Current contamination of the Great Lakes suggests a failure in past environmental

policy, a failure that was aided and abetted by limitations or failures in the science that in

formed that policy. The time has come to re evaluate theories and concepts such as assimilative capacity and safe threshold levels, particularly as applied to toxic substances
that persist and/or bioaccumulate in the environment.
It is also time to re evaluate policymaking methodologies that are based on these con-

ceptions of assimilable capacity and acceptable harm

- particularly risk assessment and

risk/bene t analysis. As currently practised, these exercises never provide a meaningful pre-

diction of real risks or real benefits. The simplified, narrow models used to quantify health
and environmental threats bear little resemblance to the complex and unpredictable phe
nomena that occur when chemical mixtures enter integrated natural systems.
Where data is sparse or harms unanticipated, risk assessments are blind; potential in
juries that are poorly understood, difficult to quantify, or simply excluded from the model,
never appear in the results. A lack of data serves as evidence of safety. On the cost side,
the availability of alternatives and the broad social and economic benefits of protective action receive inadequate attention.
'th a
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ment can become pseudoscienti c artifacts that are manipulated to justify predetermined policy decisions. Even when undertaken
in good faith, there still appears to be a systematic tendency to understate total risk relative
to total bene t. And risk assessment, with its highly technical language and its pretension
to purely quantitative decisionmaking, precludes both democratic participation and adequate
consideration of non quantitative ecological, ethical and political issues.
Legal Proof

In the American system of jurisprudence, a very strong weight of evidence is required
to convict a person who has been accused of a crime. That person is considered innocent
until proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty as determined by a
jury of peers.
This high standard is a good example of a precautionary approach. In the evolution
of our democratic society, an important value judgement was made. We decided to place
an extremely high value on preventing the incarceration or execution of persons who are innocent. It was well understood that the decision to highly value the protection of the inno-

l

cent comes at a cost to society: namely, many instances where individuals who perpetrate
criminal acts will go free. We decided, however, that the overriding public interest is to

protect the law-abiding citizen from civil authority and thereby prevent the abuse of power,

1

corruption, arbitrary action, and even honest judgment errors.

On the other hand, our society uses a different standard of proof in judging, for ex
ample, the outcome of a lawsuit involving con icting interpretations of the implications of
a contract between two equal parties. If there is a difference of opinion on the facts, determination is made by a preponderance of evidence. Neither side has a special burden of
proof to overcome. There is parity between the parties and the decision favors the evidence
that is most persuasive.

I
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The societal decision to establish a particular standard of proof in some sphere of concern re ects a societal value judgment about that sphere of concern. The standard chosen
re ects a judgment about the appropriate way to make decisions that impact that sphere of
concern under circumstances when the data is incomplete and there is uncertainty.
When the data base is rich and the level of certainty about cause and effect linkages
is high, virtually any standard of proof will yield the same result. The greater the uncer

tainty, however, the greater is the likelihood that a mistaken inference will occur. Under

such conditions, the actual outcome is as likely to be in uenced by the standard of proof in
use, as by the data and the evidence. A precautionary standard re ects a societal decision
to tilt the balance toward mistakes of one type over those of another.
Precautionary Standard
Precautionary standards are a normal part of everyday life. Common sense dictates

that there must always be a relationship between the amount of caution to be exercised, the
magnitude of potential for harm, and the degree of uncertainty in predicting outcomes.
Consider,for example, aparent attempting to determine

bo'w mucb

eedom of action to give a cbild. Tbe start

ingPOint i5 tb POtential

Signi cant barm' [ft/ 3

child is balancing on tbe ledge of a tent]; story window,

, conSlder

for gample

a parent at

temptmg to determine how much freedom of action to give a Chil d

The start_

ing point is the potential for significant
harm_

If the Child is balancing on the

theprudent parent will take preventive action, wen be

ledge of a tenth story window, the pru

fore concluding that tbe cbildis certain tofall.

dent Pare t Will take PreventiVe action,

w

a

v

v

v

even before concluding that the child is
certain to fall. If, on the other hand, the

child 18 playing on a Similar ledge four feet off the ground, a more relaxed attitude may be
appropriate and the exercise might serve as a learning experience for both parent and child.

A loving parent will take action if there is potential for the child to be killed, but can
be much more relaxed if the likely danger is a bruise or a scratch. In neither case does the
parent want to see the child hurt - but the potential for significant harm is key to determining the amount of caution and therefore, the appropriate course of action.

Another example was suggested by a friend who teaches medicine. A patient checks
into the hospital on Friday night with symptoms of pneumonia. Based on an examination of
the symptoms, the physician reaches a professional judgment that there is an 85% chance the
disease is pneumonia and a 15% chance that the patient is suffering from Legionnaires disease.
The physician must now decide which medicine to prescribe. Medicine A is very effective for treating pneumonia but is quite ineffective in treating Legionnaires disease. If,
however, medicine A is prescribed and the correct diagnosis is Legionnaires disease, by
Monday morning the patient will probably be dead.

A
Medicine B, on the other hand, is fairly effective in treating common pneumonia, but

it is not as effective as A. Medicine B, however, also works for Legionnaires disease, and
lacks significant side effects.

Simply weighing the evidence might tell the physician to prescribe medicine A.
Eighty-five times out of 100, this would be the right choice. A physician who does so,

however, makes an error and will lose the patient 15% of the time. The consequences of a

wrong choice are not identical for each outcome. Good medical practice thus requires precautionary decisionmaking.

Weighing evidence in order to decide upon a course of action under circumstances of
uncertainty is not a value neutral exercise. The loving parent does not conclude, Odds are
that the kid won t fall. The prudent physician does not decide, Statistical considerations
favor a diagnosis of pneumonia.
Precaution must be built into the rules of inference. The goal is not to determine
which description of the world is most probably correct. The goal, rather, is to make inferences that can inform a course of action that will minimize the likelihood of significant
harm. When the harm is large, the uncertainty is great, and our ability to predict the future is limited, we adopt a precautionary standard to judgment and inference.

Reverse Onus

In a criminal law case, as expressed above, a defendant is presumed innocent, the bur-

den of proof is on the state, and the jury is instructed to reach a guilty verdict only if, after

weighing all the evidence, it concludes the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a moral certainty.

By confused logic, North American
policymakers have extended these civil
liberties from people to chemicals. Without thoughtful consideration, society has
taken upon itself the burden to prove that
a particular chemical, a class of chemicals
or pollution from a particular industrial
process harms health or the environment.

In the absence of such de nitive proof,

In a criminal law care, a defendant is presumed inno

cent, tbe burden ofprocf is on tbe state, and tbejury is
instructed to reacb a guilty verdict only
after weigbing all tbe evidence, it concludes tbe defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty . . .
by confused logic, North American policymakers bave
extended tbese civil liberties ompeople to cbemicals.

the rights of chemicals to continue pollut~

ing have been protected.

Such a framework tilts the balance ofjustice in the wrong direction. It is a policy of
precaution that favors the interests of synthetic chemical manufacturers and users over and
above the interests of public health and the environment. Somehow, society has decided

that it prefers to err on the side of pollution and disease rather than to err on the side of a
clean environment and health. This principle, however, derives neither from scienti c prin-

ciples nor from some thoughtful consideration of public ethics and morality. It originated
at a time when the potential for toxic pollution to harm public health and the environment
was still poorly understood. That this policy still continues is testimony to the considerable
wealth, power and clout of the chemical manufacturing industry.

The UC proposes to change this situation with the principles of reverse onus. This
means that when applying the weight of evidence approach in deciding when to act, the
burden of proof should not be on society but rather, on the producers and users of synthetic
chemicals. Such a policy protects society from abuse of power by chemical companies, and

also from corruption, arbitrary action, and even honest judgment errors.

The Precautionary Principle

In recent years, there has been growing recognition of the potential size, scope and
duration of damage to ecosystems and health that can be caused by the production, use and
discharge of synthetic chemicals into the ecosystem. We are learning that:
1. Environmental damage can be widespread and severe before the injury and its com
plex of causes have been clearly identi ed;

2. Even after injurious practices are discontinued, environmental damage can persist for

long periods and even continue to intensify;

3. The potential for harm is unbounded and can threaten even the integrity of the hu
man species and its ability to reproduce.

As a result of this growing understanding of the significance and unpredictability of
the injury that synthetic chemicals may cause to the ecosystem, precaution has become a

byword of environmental policy. This concept was first introduced into international law in

the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of
the North Sea in 1987.
The Ministers of the Contracting Parties had agreed to address polluting emissions
of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate, at source. Their approach, often called the precautionary principle, states that action should be taken:
When there is reason to assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the
living resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even where
there is no scienti c evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.

Some argue that the IJCfs weight of evidence approach is
weaker than the precautionaryprinciple. This interpretation is
false, however, and in sharp con ict with the IjC s usage. The
weight of evidence approach does not simply involve weighing
positive against negative or inconclusive evidence according to
traditional standards ofproof The Commission, rather, has
calledprecaution the basic underpinning oftheir strategy.
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Some argue that the UC s

weight of evidence approach is
weaker than the precautionary
principle. This interpretation is
false, however, and in sharp con

ict with the lJC s usage. The

weight of evidence approach does
not simply involve weighing posi

tive against negative or inconclusive evidence according to tradi

tional standards of proof. The Commission, rather, has called precaution the basic under

pinning" of their strategy. The use of a precautionary context changes both the purpose and
the practice of weighing evidence. The issue now being explored is the development of a
methodology for weighing evidence in a precautionary framework -- or what might be
called precautionary inference.

Precautionary Inference
Two of the most important applications of the precautionary principle are zero dis. charge for persistent toxic substances and reverse onus for synthetic chemicals.
Even after these principles are adopted, however, weighing evidence in a precaution-

ary framework is still required. There will be policy decisions to make, and these will be

based in part on scienti c information that remains, as always, incomplete, inconclusive, or
indeterminate. There must be some method of evaluating evidence that is consistent with a
precautionary standard. This method can be termed precautionary inference.

Precautionary inference provides a method for making scienti c judgments based on
incomplete, inconclusive orindeterminate data in a field in which signi cant harm may oc-

cur from a false negative judgment. Unlike the current scienti c and policy framework, this
approach reverses the burden of proof, framing the question with the null hypothesis:
What evidence must we IGNORE to conclude that a causal relationship does not exist?

For example, policymakers must rely on scienti c evidence to guide decisions con
cerning which chemicals and/or classes of chemicals should be classi ed as persistent toxic
substances under the terms of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and thus subject
to virtual elimination and zero discharge.(1)

The starting points for such an evaluation are the de nitions of toxicity and persist-

ence as established by the Great Lakes Water Qiality Agreement and the International
Joint Commission:
Toxic Substance is de ned as a substance which can cause death, disease, behav
ioural abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological or reproductive mal-

functions or physical deformities in any organism or its offspring, or which can be-

come poisonous after concentration in the food chain in combination with other
substances.
is de Ined as a measure of the lon g term fate of the substance in anY
Persistence
_

envrronmental medium.

Based on these de nitions, scienti c evidence must be considered to determine
whether it is plausible to assume that a particular chemical and/or class of chemicals ts this
de nition and, therefore, should be considered persistent toxic substances under the terms
of the Agreement. Since little or no data are available for the majority of the 80,000 synthetic chemicals now in commerce,
Since little or no data are available for the majority ofthe
precautionary inference is necessary

to decide which chemicals may
reasonably be presumed to be persistent toxic substances. For ethi
cal, practical, engineering and eco
logical reasons, the IJC has con
cluded that attempts to regulate

- chemicals one-by one are doomed

80,000 synthetic chemicals now in commerce, precautionary

inference is necessary to decide which chemicals may reason
ably he presumed to hepersistent toxic substances. For ethical,
practical, engineering and ecological reasons, the I]C has con

cluded that attempts to regulate chemicals one hy-one are
doomed tofailure . . .

to failure, so the focus for environmental policy has appropriately
shifted to classes of chemicals. Thus, one role for precautionary inference is to determine

whether members of a given class of chemicals can plausibly be presumed to be persistent
toxic substances.

In this effort, consideration should be given to the environmental behavior of the

members of the class that have been studied, theoretical understanding of the chemical and
physical properties of the class, and the presence, absence and/or function of these and related compounds in nature, if they exist. If this information suggests that it is plausible to
presume that members of a chemical class may be persistent toxic substances, the onus can

be reversed. Specific exceptions may be made if it can be shown that a given compound is
not a persistent toxic substance.

A second issue for precautionary policy is the identi cation of industrial processes
and/or other anthropogenic activities that are the sources of persistent toxic substances that
have been identi ed for elimination.
Many or most chemical-based industrial processes involve the production and release
of hundreds or thousands of compounds, the majority of which are unidenti ed. With such

uncertainty, evidence must be evaluated from a precautionary stance in deciding whether a
given process or activity is a plausible source of persistent toxic substances. Relevant evidence includes theproperties of those compounds that have been identi ed in releases from
the process, the nature of the feedstocks and the process environment, and the emissions

from other processes with similar feedstocks and/0r process environments. Again, the bur
den of proof rests with those who would engage in industrial activities to demonstrate that
their processes are not sources of persistent toxic substances.
Finally, society may wish to consider causal linkages between environmental contami

nation and damage to health and the environment that has already occurred, an issue above

and beyond the implementation of the precautionary principle, reverse onus and zero dis
charge. Again, such aninquiry requires weighing the evidence in a precautionary framework. No epidemiological study can control for all confounding variables, and the webs of
cause and effect that connect chemical mixtures to global health effects are too complex to
be fully illumined by the tools and models currently available to the health sciences.
Precautionary inference in this field relies on a holistic evaluation of an integrated
body of evidence from laboratory experiments, wildlife studies and epidemiological investi
gations. The focus shifts from whether or not causal relationships have been definitively
proven to considering whether a body of direct and/or circumstantial evidence suggests a
plausible hypothesis that harm has occurred.
Conclusion

Precautionary inference is a method for evaluating scienti c evidence within a pre-

caution based policy framework. It is a system for considering scientific evidence when a
false negative judgment

Shifting the burden ofprooffrom society to those who advocate the
production and use of chemicals not only changes the standardfor
policy decisions hut has implications for the method by which evidence is weighed. Precautionary inference requires a holistic consid
eration of an integrated body of direct and circumstantial evidence.

would result in significant
harm and when there is uncertainty in our predictive

ability.

The burden of proof
rests on the producer and/or
tion must be ignored to conclude that there is no danger to health and
user of the chemical(s).
Shifting the burden of proof
the environment?
from society to those who advocate the production and use
of chemicals not only changes the standard for policy decisions but has implications for the
The central question ofprecautionary inference is,

What infbrma-

method by which evidence is weighed. Precautionary inference requires a holistic consid
eration of an integrated body of direct and circumstantial evidence. The central question of
precautionary inference is, What information must be ignored to conclude that there is no
danger to health and the environment?

This approach is particularly useful for identifying industrial processes that are likely

sources of substances that may cause harm to health and the environment, for prioritizing

classes of chemicals for phaseout, and for evaluating causal linkages between existing environmental contamination and health problems in humans and other species.

The emerging evidence on the effects of persistent toxic substances in the Great
Lakes and worldwide -- evaluated using precautionary inference -- demonstrates the great
harm that occurs when the precautionary principle is not followed in synthetic chemical
policy.

WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE VERSUS PROOF OF CAUSATION
Dr. Rosalie Bertell
International Institute of Concern

for Public Health
Toronto, Ontario

My task is to try to pull some ideas on weight of evidence together. I would say in

starting that if you think about the sh andpollution presentation (p. 15-20), which was very

good, you begin to realize what it would take to simulate such an expensive high-tech study
for people. Yet, we expect just that of the ordinary citizen whose only information source is
vital statistics, the first cause of death. A person s whole medical history is telescoped into
first cause of death. Did they die of an accident, or did they die of pneumonia or did they die

of cancer? The mobility of our population poses even more problems yet we expect the local
people to raise an alarm: Say, there is a pollution problem, and then government and industry can fund the high-tech expensive studies to dispute or elucidate the concern. Moreover,
the blame for any possible mistakes or false calls falls on the citizen or the scientist who may
have alarmed somebody. It is this disproportionate situation and the fact that little or no

resources are routinely put into looking at human health in communities at risk even though

the stakes are so high that has brought us to today s discussion. Underlying the weight of

evidence debate is the burden of proofor reverse onus debate, and disparity in resources.

I would like to consider first the talk by Glen Fox (p. 2-5), and the Hill criteria he

used for causality. Much of what is now attempted in toxicology and environmental health
is an imitation of the success with infectious disease. The human body posed a similar problem when the germs were discovered, when we started recognizing bacteria and viruses.
The human body is full of many different micro organisms. When someone gets scarlet fe
ver or polio, how does one pick out which one of those bacteria or viruses are really causing
the disease? Infectious disease studies set up certain criteria whereby a researcher can identify which one was the culprit. In some ways, it was easier than identifying toxics. There
was not an industry out there saying

Well, it wasn t my bacteria, somebody else put that

bacteria in there. What I am implying is that it was a less political struggle than toxicology. The infectious disease criteria proved to be useful and a lot of things were put into our
medical system to facilitate research. What helped was not only the kind of research that
went on, but also such routine things as pathological examination of tissue removed in surgery. One could take the tissue and look at the pathology or the pathogens present. We
don t now do this for toxicology. There is no routine toxicological study of tissue, although
millions of tissues are being removed from human bodies every day in North America. We
are not even progressed to the point of a support system to help in sorting out which
toxicants are causing which diseases. Every question raised requires an expensive special
collection of data for an epidemiological survey.
Now with this background, Sir Austin Hill, between 1965 and 1967 came out with
the list of criteria that is used by epidemiologists for determining causality. It includes varianimal
ous associated research studies such as demonstrating the effect of the toxicant in

studies. There is a list of requirements for demonstrating causality and they are fairly good.
Subsequently, during the 19705 in the U.S., a committee was pulled together of about 200
eople to research the questions we should be asking if we want to understand environmental health problems. It is again a matter of establishing the baseline, the normal.

How do
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you know when the community health is different, i.e. not normal ? What do you compare with? This research was undertaken during the 19705 and completed in about 1978.
It was supposed to become part of the 1980 US. census. It would have been a sub-study
and it would have been administered randomly, covering the whole United States and providing a common basis for comparison. We would have had some way to compare
regionally and it would have been very useful. No one really knew about this report except
for the 200 people working on it. It was voted down in Congress and the booklet, which is
still good and useful, is totally out of print. I have a copy and if anyone wants it, I will

photocopy it. It is useful, it is helpful, and we need to start asking some of these questions
routinely. Systematically collecting data would be one way of applying Hill's criteria to the
complicated reality of the 1990s.
However, I think we also have to remember that we need to improve on Hill s crite

ria of causality. It was a rst cut. It is not the last answer and I think that, given our expe-

new; a. aye. as. _..._.

rience of the last 20 30 years, we need to add some criteria to it.
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One of the Hill s criteria for causality refers to statistical significance of the nding.
Here you are trying to prevent rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, called a type I
error. The null hypothesis is that there is no connection between the toxicant and the ill
ness. Scientists protect the null hypothesis at a 5% level or a 1% level. That means one
accepts the null hypothesis unless the outcome was so unusual that it could not have hap
pened by chance more than 5% or 1% of the time. We need to expand Hill s criteria and
note the power of the test. The power of the test measures the type II error. I think that a
lot of poor science has gone on, producing a very large number of studies that show noth
ing. Just because a study shows nothing does not mean there is nothing happening. I would
tell you I know lots of ways to design studies so that no relationship between exposure and
illness shows. Anybody can do that. It takes a little more skill to design a study where
some relationship does show. What you need to know is the power of the test or the prob
ability that you will accept that null hypothesis as true when it is wrong. Every study
should report its power. It is
It takes a little more skill to design a study where some relation
rarely reported. By being more de

ship does show. What you need to know is the power of the test
or theprobability thatyou will accept that null hypothesis as true
when it is wrong. Every study should report its power. It is
rarely reported. By being more demanding that a type I error not
oecur we increase the risk ofmaking a type II error.

manding that a type I error not oc
cur we increase the risk of making
a type II error.

I think the other problem
that we have is that the Hill crite

ria were based on a linear system,

not an ecosystem approach. When
you have competing causes of death you cannot expect a linear dose-response. One of the
most obvious examples of this is looking for dose-response with respect to cancer deaths in
an area where you have low socio economic status or a third world situation, where the person is more than likely to die during the pre cancerous, infectious disease phase than of can
cer. You are not going to get the same dose response when you have competing causes of
death. You have to have a wider and broader approach to health than a particular criterion
expecting a dose-response, which is always responsive to the same degree under all circum

stances.

I think there are other problems with Hill's criteria, which are brought up nicely in

the Jacobson study (p. 9-15), in which the dose response factor can also depend on the

point in the life cycle at which the exposure occurs. You might not get a dose response with

the breast milk but you do get the dose response with in utero exposure. You have to know

the point at the life cycle that the exposure elicits a biological response. There are, for ex
ample, exposures which affect the thyroid gland. A fetal thyroid gland develops around the
fth month, so you nd a difference in fetal exposure before the fth month and after the
fth month. The same is true with any other organ system that is forming. So timing in
the life cycle is important.

Sometimes the toxic effect is in the offspring of the exposed person. I think we are

becoming more and more aware of the effect which Einstein, who was one of the most

forthright proponents of nuclear technology, pointed out and that is the subtle
intergenerational loss of intelligence in the community exposed to radiochemical pollution.
If we start damaging brains, we are going to have reduction in IQl general reduction in

population intelligence, and that moves me to what the famous geneticist, Muller, pointed

out: namely, the loss of vigour in the species. When the species starts losing vigour, you

are on a species death path or route. We have to pay more attention, not only to the long
term effect in the individual, but to the long term effects on the species. I think that as we
move into more and more subtle damage to the living system, it is going to be the
intergenerational effects that will become prominent.
Hill was primarily concerned with severe observable health damage in an exposed

person. As a medical researcher, I am concerned not about choosing severe end-points like

cancer death, but rather I am anxious to identify biomarkers at the point where the situa
tion is reversible. That means a radical change in research orientation. It means looking at

biological end-points that are less dramatic than cancer or genetic damage. I would just

point out here that once you start an intergenerational loss of vigour, you are in an irreversible pattern. The same thing relates to our fixation with looking at cancer death, which is

certainly a severe end-point. However, if there is excess cancer death it means that you have
been doing the wrong thing for some 30 40 years, and the process at that point is irrevers-

ible. One of the things that we have to do is to start looking at earlier bioindicators of deteriorating physical well being and of early signsof deteriorating vigour in the species which
might serve as early warnings of

trouble. We have done some work
0 thls aPPrOaCh and 1t 5 POSS ble'
However suCh an approaCh de-

Sometimes tbe toxic ct is in tbe o fspring oft/1e exposed per
son. I tbink we are becoming more and more aware of tbe e ect
wbicb Einstein, wbo was one of tbe mostfortbrigbt proponents

mands that one not wait for definive con rmation of causality It is
better to demonstrate probable
causality by an intervention to im

.
.
of nuclear tecbnology, pointed out and that is tbe subtle
intergenerational loss of intelligence in tbe community exposed
to radiocbemicalpollution. Ifwe start damaging brains, we are
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going to bare reduction in IQ, general reduction in population

calls. for intervention When causality

is expected to be con rmed, if the
deteriorating situation is allowed to
go to its logical conclusion.
Another problem with the
Hill criteria, given our present level

intelligence, and tbat moves me to wbat tbefamous geneticist,
Muller, pointed out: namely, tbe loss ofvigour in tbe species.
Wben tbe species starts losing vigour, you are on a species deatb
pat/.7 or route.
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of pollution, is that it basically assumes that you have a normal healthy population with

which to begin. They are exposed to something toxic and there is an ill effect. We have

been exposed to a growing number of toxic radionuclides and toxic chemical materials at an
escalating rate for the last 40-50 years and I think we have developed highly susceptible

sub-populations. I am thinking of some of the multiple chemically-sensitive people. There
are also other problems in our society which demonstrate a worsening of the host response.
Whenever you have a hazard, you have pathways to people and then you have the response
of the person.
v
The responses of people have also changed. One can t just look at the hazard and the

pathways and think of the responses as automatic. The population is not homogeneous. I
am thinking of some of the problems which bother me very much, like AIDS. AIDS is a

virus which, by its evolutionary composition, is rather an old virus. It has been around a

long time. Formerly it was observed as a terminal disease in those over 70. What is differ
ent in our time is that it is showing up in people in the 205 and 30s and that was not seen
before. But what it says to me is that something has changed in the host response. I think
there are other examples of this and we need to look more closely at host response variants.

'
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I think there are ethical questions underlying decisions with respect to pollution.
What to do about these problems is not yet clear and sometimes you have to make a judg-

ment call. I would see some differences, for example, where the citizens have a choice. If

you have a choice of avoiding a hazard it seems to me different from a hazard which is in
your air and which you really can t refuse to breathe. You might not be able to move your
residence. There is an element you have to look at when making judgments and that is the

individual s ability to avoid the exposure.

I would like to make some suggestions for further re ection. I really think we have
to esh out more clearly what we mean by a weight of evidence approach: how broad it
should be; and what it needs to consider. I have recommendations in three categories to be
studied. One is with respect to the hazards. The second one is with respect to the path
ways, and the third is with respect to the host response that I think could form the basis of
a new approach.

With respect to the bazard: I think the burden of proof, at least on many important

questions, needs to be a reverse onus. There should be a need to prove something is not
damaging before it is used, and the burden of proof should notbe on the victim to say a
toxicant is connected with a health problem. I think there are some very good models for
- testing of pharmaceuticals that could be used in this respect to screen chemicals before they
are put into the environment. I would also recommend establishing a health review board
that would be at arm s length from industry and government, that would review new

projects. Our environmental assessments do not include human health. They are very su
perficial in that regard and I would call for a health assessment of every major new project.

I think we can also recognize science advocacy as legitimate. Scientists are always

trying to say that they are purely objective, but it is not really true. It is impossible to avoid

choices such as what to research, how to design a study, what related research is credible,

etc. I think we should be more honest and forthright. I would recommend two ways of
dealing with this: one would be some type of a science court where there could be at least a
clarification of the issues. I also participated in a good system the Germans thought up
when they were trying to deal with the Kalkar breeder reactor which was on the border between Holland and Germany. If there was an accident it would be an international affair.
They were trying to make an estimate of the extent of nine accident scenarios. What they
did is put out calls for a grant proposal for estimating the health effects of these nine accidents and they gave out two contracts, one to people who were proponents of the reactor,
and one to people who were opponents of the reactor. Both groups were given exactly the
same baseline data, they were given access to the same computer programs and software,

and they were told to come up with the estimates of the number of health effects for each
of these nine accidents. The study was mandated by the Bundestag. It was an excellent
process and clarified a lot. The predicted numbers of casualties ended up different, but we
could explain exactly why they were different, where the decisions had been made, what

things were scientific and what estimates were judgment calls. I think more of that type of
assessment would help.
I would also recommend that we move from the relative risk statistic to a little more
sophisticated one which is called the attributable proportion. It is a derivative statistic.

There has been a lot of development of this statistic within the last five to seven years. It was
rst proposed about 1970. The attributable proportion is a statistical quantity which would

let you estimate, for example, what proportion of lung cancers are due to a particular expo

sure. You might say 17% are due to smoking and 2% are due to radon gas, and so on. You can
begin to attribute proportions. That gives you an upper limit for the possibility of improvement. In other words, if only 20% of the cases are connected with an exposure, then your
massive program to reduce that exposure can at best give you 20% improvement in a health
statistic. It tells you where to put your public health effort, for one thing. Attributable proportion can be estimated now in stratified samples, for example age specific. It is quite a

sophisticated technology which is available to us and which I think we should start using.

I would also move into such things as proportional compensation. This addresses
some of the legal issues. Compensation for injury for workers, or a law suit for the public,

is usually all or nothing. You win or lose in this situation. I think we could begin to deal

with it in a much more sensible fashion if we used attributable proportion. If we said 20%
of the cases are due to this exposure, then 20% of all health cost for this illness would be
covered. There will be resistance to this on the part of the public, but I think we need to
move out of the deadlock situation and find new ways of dealing with compensation. Lifestyle choices could enter into the funding of medical care. If 17% of the lung cancers were
due to smoking, and you chose to smoke, maybe you should pick up 17% of your health
related costs. There are possibilities here. I am not saying those are perfect answers but I
am trying to open up a future where we can dialogue and we can find a better way to deal
with the problems than in the past.
I have found it particularly hard to deal in the legal framework where basically you
have to double the incidence of disease to meet the legal standards of probable cause. You
can say it is more probable that the disease is caused by the exposure, than that it was caused
by something else if the disease rate is more than doubled. To ful ll this requirement in
law, an industry has to suddenly double the occurrence of some disease through its pollution
or there is no compensation. That is an irrational kind of criteria and puts a scientist in a
terrible position. It also implies you can keep increasing gradually the levels, say of cancer
or birth defects, and would never be legally responsible for causing the problems. It is a
dif cult area. We certainly need an interdisciplinary approach and we need some creative
ideas on how to handle decisions. I would look forward to working with people over the
next two years and try to get some very clear criteria for decisionmaking.
With respect to the second
area, namely patbways, we need to

investigate biochemical changes af

ter the pollutant is released. For
example, cobalt 60 was ignored as a

milk contaminant during the nu-

clear fallout period because the

body has a short residency period

for inorganic cobalt. In the field,
however, inorganic cobalt was in
corporated into Vitamin B12 in the
cow s rumen. This has a much
longer residency period in the body
and is stored in liver. Incorporation

I bave und itparticularly bard to deal in tbe legalframework
wbere basically you ba've to double tbe incidence of disease to
meet tbe legal standards ofprobable cause. You can say it is
more probable tbat tbe disease is caused by tbe exposure, tban

tbat it was caused by sometbing else the disease rate is more
tban doubled. T O ll ll tbis requirement in law, an industry

bas to suddenly double tbe occurrence ofsome disease tbrougb its
pollution or tbere is no compensation. Tbat is an irrational
kind ofcriteria andputs a scientist in a terribleposition.
*
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into the food chain may also be a slow process. The United Nations estimates that carbon
14 will have its maximum public health impact 150 years after release to the environment.

Sometimes the toxic material is not released but its precursor is released.

The third area which needs broadening in the weight of evidence approach has to do
with bost response. This might include past health history of a community, other toxic exposures, differential protection for pregnant women or persons with multiple chemical sensi
tivities. Protection may relate to age, sex, life cycle, occupation, ethnic background or other
pertinent factors.
Hopefully these complex issues, which are of serious import, can be discussed in an
open and constructive dialogue involving industry, scientists, government, human rights pro
ponents, ethicists and the interested public.

a

DISCUSSION

In about a year Dr. Needleman will be testifying in a United States
Daniel Green:
court in a product liability suit involving exposures of plaintiffs to lead. The evidence concern

ing PCB discharges to the Great Lakes could result in similar product liability suits against

Monsanto as the company that produced PCBs in North America. If you, Dr. Jacobson, were
asked by a defense lawyer whether prenatal exposure to PCBs of a particular child in your
study had caused a diminishment of intellectual potential, would you answer yes or no ?
We are in a different position from Dr. Needleman with his find
JosephJacobson:
ings on lead. The lead literature contains multiple studies that con rm Dr. Needleman s
studies.

Unidenti ed:

How did the Commission use the concept of weight of evidence,

pertaining to an individual chemical, to lead to the decision to recommend sunsetting a class
of chemicals?
Chairman Durnil: I think that the recommendation had more to do with the commit
ments that the two governments made on virtual elimination and their inability to achieve that
end through regulation alone. We believed that ratcheting down the allowable discharges, for
example ofthe 11 critical substances listed by the Water Qiality Board, would never get you to
virtual elimination and that for these unnatural compounds there has to be zero human input.
Unidenti ed:

How long does it take for the actions to stop the emissions of

dioxins to show up as changes in the environment?

Willie Owens:
In terms
of the levels of dioxins in fish,
dioxins have a half-life of about six
virtual elimination and their inability to achieve that end
months. As we started to ratchet
through regulation alone. We believed that ratcheting down the
down the ef uent we would start
allowable discharges, for example of the 11 critical substances to see changes the following spring
listed by the Water Quality Board, would never get you to vir
and they would continue to de
tual elimination and thatfor these unnatural compounds there cline. Pulp and paper ef uents are
extremely complex mixtures of
has to be zero human input.
Chairman Durnil: I think that the recommendation had more
to do with the commitments that the two governments made on

chemicals and the first question to
ask is whether there were any
problems with the new process or
the product. Toxicity is a biological response to something, so that is why I personally advocate that both Environment Canada and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency undertake assessment of the health of organisms on a regional basis, both for point and

nonpoint sources in watersheds. In the past it has taken 15 20 years to determine that
something has gone wrong. But it takes resources and well developed measurement systems to move forward as a society.

The International Joint Commission and several other bodies in
Unidenti ed:
the US. are calling for a de nition of weight of evidence. Industry has said that it is committed to being a part of the process of de ning weight of evidence and how it should be
used. What should we recommend about how to proceed?
Chairman Durnil:

The Commission does not have the resources to do that well

enough but we have made it one of our priorities for the next two-year cycle, and based on

these comments we can think of how to proceed. Obviously if industry is not a part of it, it

will not work.

Saulius Simoliunas: Professor Berger said that now the court will recognize that there
are two proofs, one scienti c proof, one legal proof. I hope that there will be some Supreme Court judge to explain that, because to me it does not make too much sense.

Wayne Schmidt:
I work for the National Wildlife Federation and we are one of the
groups that place great reliance on Joe and Sandra Jacobson s research because of its importance in the policy making arena. What is your reaction to the criticism of your research,
particularly among the health care professionals?

Well, I am perplexed by some of the criticism. A lot of the critiJosephJacobson:
failure to control for things that we did control for, particularly
alleged
our
on
cism focusses
My own caution about our findings has to do with the
pregnancy.
during
maternal drinking
magnitude of the deficits which are modest, and the longer-term implications of the de

cits are as yet unknown. What we have is a clear preliminary indication, from a single pro
spective study, that there is some damage, but the extent of the damage and the practical
significance of that damage are unfortunately not all that clear as yet.

These things take a long time. From the experience of 30 years in
Rosalie Bertell:
public health, I can say that everything is shaded and controversial, and you are going

against conventional wisdom. For example, by the 19305 the relationship between smoking

and lung cancer were relatively de nitive. In 1919, insurance companies would not insure
asbestos workers. One hundred years after the uranium mining disaster in Czechoslovakia,
it was repeated in the southwest United States. Public health consistently resists the ow
of the evidence.
Glen Fox:

More than 20 years have elapsed since the time that we knew that

we had this serious toxicological

problem in the Great Lakes. Pub

and stopping the cholera outbreak.

Tbere is an evolution ofknowledge. Wben PCBs were rstpro' duced in tbe 19303, no one knew about persistence or
bioaccumulation. It was only in tbe mid 1960: and tbe early
1970s, wben Jensen was seeing tbese cbemicals in tbe seals in tbe
Baltic, tbatpeople understood the implications ofthis select set of

ing about the health of future gen-

compounds. Ifyou do not have a mecbanism, you only [Save an
observation andyou are not much trtberforward.

lic health should be about taking

the proverbial handle off the pump

There will be costs, there will be
risks and possibly mistakes and
dollars to industry, but we are talk
erations and about the ecosphere.
For many substances we cannot do
the kinds of studies being advo-

cated by Willie Owens.

Willie Owens:

There is an evolution of knowledge. When PCBs were first pro-

duced in the 19305, no one knew about persistence or bioaccumulation. It was only in the
mid-19605 and the early 19705, when Jensen was seeing these chemicals in the seals in the

Baltic, that people understood the implications of this select set of compounds. If you do
not have a mechanism, you only have an observation and you are not much further forward.

I find that rather scary. For substances such as PCBs we now have
Glen Fox:
a fairly complete picture which includes biological mechanisms that make biological sense.
But this took a very long period of time and we still have not got PCBs under control.
What will happen when the next kind of lesion or syndrome occurs? Will we be able to

respond any quicker to investigate it or to control the substance that caused it?

That is where I come back to biological monitoring of our ecosys
Willie Owens:
at the time was a system network that could indicate whether or
needed
was
What
tems.

not the waters and bird colonies were all right. There seemed to be insuf cient resources or
an information network to build on the initial observations in colonies in the Toronto and

Hamilton area. There was an insuf cient mass of evidence to get peoples attention.

Jim Macaulay:
PCBs?

Could Dr. Jacobson not find a group that was not exposed to

We started with the premise that everyone is exposed and so the
JosephJacobson:
design of our research was to investigate whether the more highly exposed infants or chil
dren consistently performed more poorly.

If PCBs are only an indicator of other exposures, this has a lot of
Unidenti ed:
policy implications, for instance if it is dioxins. Do animal studies indicate that there are a
lot of compounds that may be responsible for the kinds of things that you are seeing?
JosephJaeobson:

Research on animals exposed to PCBs and speci c PCB congeners

has shown the same kinds of behavioral effects that we have seen in our cohort, but there is
very little work on other compounds in this regard.

At the beginning of this long and interesting discussion, somebody
Unidenti ed:
used the word ethics, before we skated off into some other fascinating material.
It is important to monitor the ecosystem, but we cannot keep
Ann Mahan:
putting things into the ecosystem and then monitoring to nd out what is happening. Using reverse onus, we need to assume that it can cause harm until we know that it does not.
Unidenti ed:

That is what has been happening to the farm workers in California.

Wbat will bappen wben tbe next kind of lesion or syndrome
occurs? Will we be able to respond any quicker to investigate
it or to control tbe substance tbat caused it?
That is wbere I come back to biological monitoring of our eco
systems. Wbat was needed at tbe time was a system network
tbat could indicate wbetber or not the waters and bird colo
nies were all rig/st. Tbere seemed to be insu icient resources

or an information network to build on tbe initial observations in colonies in tbe Toronto and Hamilton area. Tbere
was an insu icient mass ofevidence to getpeoples attention.

When one pesticide is nally forced
off the market because of the injury
to the health of farm workers, a new
one is substituted. I am also concerned about the ethics of research-

ers, educators and funding organiza-

tions. For example, there are scien
tists who apply for grants agusing the

jargon of the funding agency, but in

stead undertake the studies that are
of interest to them. Politics are used
to in uence what gets funded and
how the information is released and
ISCd, and there are examples of in

tellectual dishonesty where statistical
data are massaged to obtain the politically correct answer for publication in an Ivy League
journal.

As a member of the public, I want to know how do officials make
Karey Shinn:
practical preventive decisions about public health under conditions of crisis management?
Most information is unusable under these conditions since it is frequently designed only to
be usable a few generations from now. In practice, a mayor or a schoolteacher, who may
not be a scientist, makes decisions with far-reaching consequences based on very little infor
mation but based on the opinions of those who are available.
Robert Schubring: What was the basis for the Commission s decision to advocate a
sunset on all chlorine manufacture? Was it based on the fact that there were quantities of
DDT and certain other chlorinated pesticides in the Great Lakes for which the Commis-

sion had a mandate under the Treaty to achieve virtual elimination from the Great Lakes?

On June 7, 1990, the Commission set out a series of priorities that
Gordon Dumil:
included an examination of the terminology of the policy contained in the Great Lakes Water Qiality Agreement concerning virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances. This

has been the policy of the Canadian and United States Governments since the signing of
the revised Agreement in 1978. Through the Virtual Elimination Task Force and a series
of roundtable discussions involving industry, environmental groups, and scientists and regulators, we arrived at the conclusion that the policy was unattainable through regulation
alone. We recommended that for those substances that were so onerus that society cannot
tolerate them, there must be some date, whether it is five years, 10 years, or even 50 years,

when the substances will no longer be brought into existence. We reviewed the list of 11
critical pollutants set out by the Water Quality Board. The majority of them are chlorin
ated organics, which then raised the question of how do you deal with chlorinated organics,
where the evidence indicates they are harmful, without dealing with chlorine itself.
Robert Schubring: Chlorine is essential to the manufacture of items critical for na
tional defense, such as silicone for micro chips and titanium for aircraft turbine blades, and
for the manufacture of platinum catalytic converters for air pollution control on automobiles. Our concern is how do you get from 11 toxic substances in the Great Lakes, that
your body has a mandate to oversee, to something that has absolutely no relevance to that
whatsoever?
Gordon Durnil:
That is your conclusion, not mine. We recommended that indus
try had to be involved in setting a timetable, so that there was no social or economic disruption.
John Mahan:
A
large
part of society believes that if we
can get enough science and technology we can solve the problem. Science is a system of inquiry. It is not
a

system

of

answers

or

of

decisionmaking. No matter how

much science we have, there is always more science we will want and
need and we will never have all the
answers, but decisionmaking comes

through judgment, wisdom and eth-

ics. Science is a tool, not a solution.
And so we need to use the best sci
ence we can, but we ve got to go beyond that and be guided by ethics.
That takes us to reverse onus and
the precautionary principle.

A large part ofsociety believes that we can get enough science
and technology we can solve the problem. Science is a system of
inquiry. It is not a system ofanswers or ofdecisionmahing. No
matter how much science we have, there is always more science

we will want and need and we will never have all the answers,

but decisionmahing comes through judgment, wisdom and ethics. Science is a tool, not a solution. And so we need to use the
best science we can, but we ve got to go beyond that and be

guided by ethics.
It seems that there are no easy answers in these complex issues,

since it is di icult to make policy decisions to protect an ecosystem
or a sensitive species when there will be e écts on the socioeco
nom ic structure ofour society.

Thomas Hocrman: I am an employee of the BASF Corporation. I seem to recall that

situational ethics is a principle whereby you look for the greatest good for the greatest

number. It seems that there are no easy answers in these complex issues, since it is difficult to
make policy decisions to protect an ecosystem or a sensitive species when there will be effects
on the socioeconomic structure of our society.

One practical point of view relating to the precautionary principle
Valerie Denney:
is that there is not enough money, either in industry or in government, to nance all the
studies that all of us would like to see done to ensure a high degree of certainty about a lot
of these chemicals. There are just too many that have been accumulating for too long and
that may have synergistic effects. We need both to be cost effective and to protect public

health. In a time that the public is overtaxed and resisting spending more money on regulation, the precautionary principle must be combined with a transitional program that meets
the needs of workers affected by these decisions.
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Ann Jarrell:

I think that we need to focus on how policy makers make decisions

since this is not studied enough. As a scientist working for the Health Standards Division

of the Occupational Safety and Health Association, I developed a scientific record which

was reviewed, but the decision was taken out of my hands and made at the political level.
Whatever exposure level was set would not necessarily coincide with my recommendation.
Gordon Durnil:
The scienti c community often forgets that communication from
one level to the next level is a critical element. Whether scientists are trying to communicate to
a congressman or member ofparliament or a CEO, there needs to be clear communication even
though this can be a very difficult thing to do effectively with technically complex material.
Unidenti ed:

We need a way of determining the economic feasibility of many of

these chemicals and of their alternatives. Companies bene t from the products, but it is

the citizens who must find the resources to ght these chemicals. I prefer a reverse onus
model in which the 15,000 organochlorine chemicals would be banned and, if a company
wants one particular organochlorine substance, let the company undertake the studies to
prove the safety of the chemical. When the results are completed, they should be made
available to citizens who may wish to argue about the safety in an open forum.
Glen Fox:
I am concerned that the economists are not developing the science
of economics to deal with environmental issues, or if they have, it is not widely used. As a
regulator, I have sometimes come to the conclusion that a product was ecologically dangerous. But in preparing a risk benefit or a cost benefit analysis, the environment always ends

up looking as though it has no value.

Rosalie Bertell:
In the preparation of the Ontario Hydro 25-year plan, we investigated the human health costs of each of the different ways of producing electricity. In es
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. Gordon Durnil:
Yesterday,
David Crombie commented on
changing our ways of thinking and the interdependency of economic health with environmental health. For example, when we talk about relative risk, are we going to accept that it
does not apply to minorities who need a free source of food such as the catfish from the
Detroit River? We watch the dissatisfaction of voters in our two countries primarily electing people they do not want, because they do not want who they have.
Unidenti ed:

There seems to be an analogy between how some people are super-

sensitive to chemicals because of the general degradation of our general health, and the viru-

lence ofzebra mussels and other exotic species in already weakened ecosystems. I should like to

see more emphasis on the teaching of the scienti c method. This would produce more independent thinkers willing to explore alternative hypotheses and might inspire better solutions
from less authoritarian types of personality structures.
Jack Weinberg:
As we approach the next millenium, humankind is facing issues
that we never faced before because, in the past 50 years, we have obtained the capacity to
disrupt ecosystems on a global scale rather than, as previously, on a local or regional scale.
The conservation ethic has helped us to start putting a value on species and on the value of
natural beauty. But if we do not note what is happening to nature as a result of human
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action and callously place no value on what we are losing, then we are jeopardizing our own
survival as a species.
Gordon Durnil:
Inthe next two years, the Commission will be wrestling with the
subject of weight of evidence as one of our priorities. I would like Brad Leinhart, Jack
Weinberg, Rosalie Bertell, and Glen Fox to write what they think we should be doing on
this topic in as productive a way as possible, and send it to Mike Gilbertson at the Regional
Of ce. I want to thank you all for coming to this workshop. It has been most enlightening
to me and I really appreciate it.

